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ARTICLES
“DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS” IN THE GIG
ECONOMY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
MIRIAM A. CHERRY AND ANTONIO ALOISI*
In recent years, lawsuits alleging the misclassification of workers as
“independent contractors” rather than “employees” have become widespread in
the United States. Determining employee status is important because such
status is a gateway to many substantive legal rights. In response, some
commentators have proposed an in-between hybrid category just for the gig
economy. However, such an intermediate category is not new. In fact, it has
existed in many countries for decades, producing successful results in some
and misadventure in others. We use a comparative approach to analyze the
experiences of Canada, Italy, and Spain with the intermediate category. In
Italy, the quasi-subordinate category created an opportunity for arbitrage that
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wish to thank William (Bill) Johnson, the Director of Saint Louis University’s Center
for Comparative and International Law (“CICL”) and the new Dean of Saint Louis
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assistance and for hosting a workshop in which we presented this paper to the faculty
of Saint Louis University School of Law. For excellent comments, thank you to Chad
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resulted in less worker protection. The end result was confusion, and since
2015, the third category’s use has been extremely limited. Spain’s third
category, the TRADE, was only made available to a small percentage of selfemployed workers because of the burdensome nature of its regulations and the
high dependency threshold required for inclusion. As for Canada, the practical
result of the “dependent contractor” category was to expand the definition of
employee and to bring more workers under the ambit of labor law protection.
We ultimately conclude that workable proposals for a third category must also
encompass other forms of precarious employment. Working within the existing
framework, one solution would be to change the default
presumptions regarding the two categories that already exist. Above a
minimum threshold of hours worked or income earned, the default rule would
be an employment relationship for most gig workers except those that may fit
into a “safe harbor” for de minimis amateurs or volunteers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................ 637
I. The Context of Crowdwork ..................................................... 640
A. The Scope of the On-Demand Economy ......................... 640
B. Legal Standards for Determining Worker Status............. 642
C. The Uber Litigation and Settlement ................................ 644
II. Recent Proposals for a Third Category Focused on the Gig
Economy ................................................................................... 646
III. A Comparative Approach......................................................... 650
A. The Canadian Experience: Professor Harry Arthurs
and “Dependent Contractors” .......................................... 651
B. The Italian Case: Unintended Consequences and
Arbitrage of the Categories ............................................... 656
1. The introduction of the legislation on “parasubordinazione” .............................................................. 660
2. Policy lessons from the Italian experience with the
quasi-subordinate category .......................................... 666
C. An Economic Threshold for the Third Category: The
Spanish Case ...................................................................... 667
1. The creation of the TRADE ........................................ 671
2. The low number of TRADE workers and
developments on the EU level .................................... 674
D. Summary and Assessment of the Outcomes in Canada,
Spain, and Italy .................................................................. 675
IV. Analysis of Worker Misclassification in the Gig Economy:
Solutions and Implications ...................................................... 676

CHERRYALOISI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/13/2017 6:35 PM

“DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS” IN THE GIG ECONOMY

637

A. Working Backwards to Determine Rights for the Third
Category ............................................................................. 677
B. Practical Difficulties with Implementation of a Third
Category ............................................................................. 680
C. Shifting Towards a Default Presumption of Employee
Status .................................................................................. 682
D. Safe Harbor for Volunteerism and Alternative
Business Models ................................................................. 685
E. Broader Implications......................................................... 687
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 688

INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a spate of lawsuits across the United States
alleging that platforms in the “on demand” economy have misclassified
their workers as independent contractors.1 In response to the
litigation and widespread confusion about how these workers should
be classified, there have been proposals for a “third” or “hybrid”
category to be created in the United States, situated between the
categories of “employee” and “independent contractor.” Regardless of
whether these workers would be denominated “dependent
contractors” or “independent workers,” these proposals for
establishing a hybrid category have sparked debate and controversy.2
Proponents advocate that an intermediate category is necessary for the
modern economic and technological realities of the gig economy.
They also suggest that a third category is a novel innovation,
appropriately crafted for the era of digital platform work.3
In fact, the intermediate category between employee and
independent contractor is not new. Many foreign legal systems have
already had decades of experience with implementing an
intermediate category.4 In this Article we employ a comparative
approach and examine the laws of three countries that have such
1. For a listing of the ongoing litigation surrounding the on-demand economy,
see Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584–85 (2016).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., Vin Gurrieri, Uber Cases Could Spur New Employee Classification, LAW360
(May 6, 2016, 8:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/793584.
4. See VALERIO DE STEFANO, INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, THE RISE OF THE “JUST-IN-TIME
WORKFORCE”: ON-DEMAND WORK, CROWDWORK AND LABOUR PROTECTION IN THE “GIGECONOMY” 19 (2016) (comparing different countries’ approaches to workers in
intermediate categories and highlighting Italy’s system of extending labor
protections beginning in 1973).
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ences with a third category: Canadaa, Italy, and Spain.5 Th
hese
experie
legal systems
s
havve had varyying successs in some instances aand
6
misadvventure in others.
o
Be
efore reflexxively launching a hyb
brid
categorry for platfo
orm work in the United
d States, we should seek
k to
undersstand and evvaluate the experiencess of other n
nations in th
heir
implem
mentation off the interme
ediate catego
ory.
Classsification as an employyee is a “gaateway” to d
determine w
who
deserve
es the protecctions of labo
or and emplloyment lawss, including the
right to
o organize, minimum
m
waage, and uneemployment compensatiion,
to nam
me just a fe
ew of the benefits
b
thaat are part and parcel of
employyee status.7 As such, classification
n as an em
mployee is “an
importtant instrume
ent for the delivery
d
of wo
orkers’ rightts.”8 Furtherr, it
is impo
ortant to no
ote that lesso
ons we can d
draw from tthe on-demaand
econom
my are not specific only to platform s or gig jobss. Increasingly,
work in
n the mode
ern economyy is becomin
ng casualizeed, outsourcced,

5. We
W chose Canaada, Italy, and Spain for thiss comparative sstudy in particcular
because these countriies illustrated a broad arrayy of experiencces with the th
hird
categoryy. In addition,, we are aware
e of a comparaative study thatt is in progresss to
examine
e the German and the Japaanese experien
nces. Germanyy is an intrigu
uing
example
e because of the
e presence of a category that applies to “wo
orker-like perso
ons.”
See Wolfg
gang Däubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L.. & POL’Y J. 77, 77–
78 (1999
9) (describing employee-like persons as “fo
ormally indepeendent contracctors
without any personal subordination,
s
but [that] aree characterized
d by a position
n of
ence”); Ryuich
hi Yamakawa,, New Wine in Old Botttles?
economiic independe
Employee//Independent Coontractor Distincction Under Japaanese Labor Law
w, 21 COMP. LABB. L.
& POL’Y J. 99, 103 (19
999) (describin
ng how German
n labor law in
nfluenced Japan
nese
courts and
a
administrattive agencies). We are also aware that th
he third catego
ory’s
historicaal origins are so
omewhat apocryyphal. When C
Canada was con
ntemplating a th
hird
categoryy in the 1960s, they referenced Sweden.. Modern daay Sweden’s legal
landscap
pe is described
d in Kent Källsström, Employm
ment and Contraact Work, 21 CO
OMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 157
7 (1999). In any
a event, the third categoryy is well-known
n in
jurisdictiions outside the
e United Statess.
6. The
T categories in these legal systems
s
were fo
ormulated befo
ore the on-dem
mand
economyy existed, butt they tried to
t address oth
her forms off non-standard
d or
continge
ent work. For example,
e
in Caanada, the third
d category deveeloped in respo
onse
to a perceived problem
m with small trradespeople wh
ho were nomin
nally self-emplo
oyed
urposes—econo
omically depen
ndent on one laarge
but who were—for all intents and pu
customer. See infra Section III.A.
S Matthew W.
W Finkin, Beeclouded Work, Beclouded Woorkers in Histoorical
7. See
Perspectivve, 37 COMP. LAB
B. L. & POL’Y J. 603, 611 (2016
6).
8. Guy
G Davidov, The
T Reports of My
M Death Are Grreatly Exaggerateed: “Employee” as a
Viable (T
Though Over-Used
d) Legal Conceptt, in BOUNDARIEES AND FRONTIE RS OF LABOUR LAW:
GOALS AND
A
MEANS IN THE REGULATIO
ON OF WORK 1
133, 134 (Guyy Davidov & Brian
Langille eds., 2006).
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and broken apart.9 Workers are being managed by and through data,
often through algorithms, and—even without a platform—many
sectors are seeing the rise of the just-in-time workforce.10 Rather than
create a special classification category only for the gig economy, any
proposal for a new category would ideally be formulated to
ameliorate conditions for other forms of precarious work and
fissured workplaces.
This Article proceeds by first providing a brief context on
crowdwork and the gig economy. Part II summarizes the current
proposals for an intermediate category for the gig economy in the
United States. Part III describes the legal systems of Canada, Italy,
and Spain, and their experiences with implementation of the third
category. Canada’s implementation was perhaps the most successful,
focusing on expanding the coverage of laws aimed at “employees” to
encompass vulnerable small businesses and tradespeople. Italy, on
the other hand, saw systemic arbitrage between the standard
employment category and the intermediate category. The result was
confusion and the stripping of workers’ rights by misclassifying them
downwards. Spain revised its laws fairly recently, but because of
burdensome requirements and a seventy-five percent dependency
threshold to enter the third category, the category covered few
Spanish workers.
Informed by these experiences, Part IV provides a detailed analysis
of the larger implications of the three national case studies for labor
law. These policy suggestions are guided by two overarching values:
fairness for workers and safe harbors for platforms that are truly
engaging in volunteerism-based work, community-organized business
models, or only de minimis engagement with the paid labor force. For
the first value of worker protection, legislators, legal scholars, and
commentators must be cognizant of how establishing a third category
could result in increasing arbitrage between the categories. In the
Italian case, some workers actually lost protections as businesses took

9. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 94–95 (2014) (listing mechanisms used
by employers to outsource and break apart work, including subcontracting and
franchising); see also Judy Fudge, Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The
Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 609,
616 (2006) (describing the impact of the changing organization of labor on
employment relationships).
10. Cherry, supra note 1, at 596–97.
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advantage of the legal confusion engendered by the creation of an
intermediate category.11
The default rule, we propose, should be employee status or
something that, at the very least, resembles it closely. Numerous ondemand companies are already moving in this direction because they
want the ability to control, train, and maintain a stable workforce—
hallmarks of the employment relationship.12 At the same time, we
readily acknowledge that there are parts of the on-demand economy
that are not about labor relations or potential exploitation of
workers; rather, they are about communities, genuine sharing, and
innovation. Any reform to address labor issues for platforms should
include safe harbors for people who are genuinely sharing in such a
way that paid work is secondary or tertiary to their goals. In our
proposal, the threshold would be low, providing a way of separating
one-off transactions or volunteerism from various forms of
employment. The balancing of these interests will further worker
protection and coverage of those who are using platforms as an
equivalent to professional employment, while exempting those who
are using these platforms to create community.
I.

THE CONTEXT OF CROWDWORK

A. The Scope of the On-Demand Economy
Technology is increasingly changing the efficiencies and modalities
of work.13 In an earlier article, one of the Authors referred to this
11. DE STEFANO, supra note 4, at 19 (explaining how businesses used the legal
confusion “as a cheap alternative to employment relationships”).
12. Greg Bensinger, Startups Scramble to Define “Employee,” WALL ST. J. (July 30,
2015,
12:01
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/startups-scramble-to-defineemployee-1438228860 (highlighting companies that have reclassified their
contractors as employees).
13. This Section is a broad review of the legal landscape of the on-demand
economy. As much of it has been covered elsewhere, we will be correspondingly
brief. We have largely adapted this section from both of the Authors’ earlier work
that described the particular features, structures, economics, and legal issues of the
gig economy. See generally Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on
Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 653 (2016); Cherry, supra note 1. For additional background
information on the gig economy, see generally Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the
“Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “GigEconomy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471 (2016); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform,
101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 87 (2016); Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the
Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016); Brishen Rodgers, The Social Costs of
Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015).
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trend as “virtual work,”14 and it has also been described as “labor as a
service,” “peer production,” “playbor,” or “crowdwork.”15 Some
processes of “crowdwork” or “micro-labor” involve computer-based
work that is performed wholly in cyberspace, where work is broken
down into its smallest constituent parts—such as coding, describing,
or tagging the thousands of items for sale on a website.16 Other types
of crowdwork are aided by cellphone applications (“apps”) or
websites. They rely on technology to deploy workers to perform
tasks—such as driving, grocery delivery, or home repair services—for
requesters in the real world paying for these services, with the app or
platform keeping a percentage of the exchange.17
According to a recent survey conducted by Time Magazine, over
fourteen million people currently work in the “gig,” “on-demand,”
“platform,” or “sharing” economy.18 While these statistics have been

14. Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011)
(using the term “virtual work” broadly not only to encompass virtual worlds but also
to refer to work taking place online, including the type of micro-labor crowdwork
performed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk).
15. See TREBOR SCHOLZ & LAURA Y. LIU, SITUATED TECHNOLOGIES PAMPHLETS 7:
FROM MOBILE PLAYGROUNDS TO SWEATSHOP CITY 22 (Omar Khan et al. eds., 2010),
http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/files/ST7-MobilePlaygrounds_SweatshopCity
.pdf; Derrick Harris, Why Labor as a Service Is as Cloudy as It Gets, GIGAOM (Aug. 22,
2010, 9:00 AM), https://gigaom.com/2010/08/22/why-labor-as-a-service-is-as-cloudyas-it-gets (analogizing “labor as a service” to cloud computing); Julian Kücklich,
Precarious Playbour: Modders and the Digital Games Industry, FIBRECULTURE J. (Dec. 5,
2005, 12:00 AM), http://five.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-025-precarious-playbourmodders-and-the-digital-games-industry (explaining the rise of “playbour” in the
entertainment industry).
16. See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto
for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 929 (2009) (“Computer
technology in the hands of the masses has made available software programs that can
create music, documents, and art just as well as expensive studios did in the past.
This democratization of technology disrupts the monopoly on the creative means of
production. The world of amateur production also demonstrates that many are
motivated by noncommercial reasons.”); Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED
(June 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2006/06/crowds (using the term
“crowdsourcing” to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from
diverse groups of users on the Internet); see also Irene Mandl, Working Conditions in
Crowd Employment and ICT-Based Mobile Work, in THE DIGITAL ECONOMY AND THE SINGLE
MARKET: EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN EUROPE, 111, 115
(Werner Wobbe et al. eds., 2016), http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/4200c007-f19f4aec-be49-1789d5804674/book-feps-hd-okpdf.pdf.
17. See De Stefano, supra note 13, at 471–72 (describing the types of work
activities that use apps to facilitate business).
18. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6,
2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll.
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the subject of controversy,19 there can be no doubt that technology is
re-shaping the future of work. Examples include websites and apps
that range from Amazon Mechanical Turk,20 Handy,21 Instacart,22 to
Uber.23 These new companies’ labor practices have sparked intense
litigation in the United States.24 Currently, the litigation is focusing
on a common doctrinal issue: whether the workers in the on-demand
economy have the status of employees or independent contractors.25
The question of employee status is particularly important because it is
a threshold question to determine the rights and benefits owed in
U.S. employment law. Important substantive rights—including
“minimum wage, protection from discrimination, unemployment
insurance, [and] worker’s compensation,” to name a few—are only
triggered for those workers who are deemed to be “employees.”26
B. Legal Standards for Determining Worker Status
Under U.S. law, whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor is determined through various multi-factored tests
dependent on the facts of the relationship.27 The “control” test
19. Cole Stangler, December Jobs Report: How Many Gig Economy Workers Are There,
Really?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016, 7:33 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/december
-jobs-report-how-many-gig-economy-workers-are-there-really-2255765
(describing
prominent economists Alan Kreuger and Larry Mishel’s quibble with the numbers in
the Time survey, and their argument that the numbers of on-demand economy
workers are far lower); see also id. (highlighting consulting firm McKinsey &
Company’s study finding that “less than one percent of the U.S. working-age
population work in the gig economy”). Interestingly, both economists have
ideological reasons for minimizing the number of workers. If the number of workers
in the on-demand economy is small, it supports the argument that there is no need
for regulation—a notion that Kreuger, who once consulted for Uber, could get
behind. The reason for Mishel’s minimization of the on-demand economy may have
to do with the idea that labor unions should continue to appeal to their traditional
base and ignore technological change. Lawrence Mishel, Uber Is Not the Future of
Work, ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015
/11/uber-is-not-the-future-of-work/415905.
Regardless of whose numbers we
believe, or what conclusions we are to draw from them, the fact is that these estimates
and analyses are subject to debate and controversy.
20. AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last
visited Feb. 5, 2017).
21. HANDY, http://www.handy.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
22. INSTACART, https://www.instacart.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
23. UBER, https://www.uber.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
24. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 1, at 581–82.
26. See id. at 578.
27. See Katharine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment
Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP.
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derives from case law and decisions on agency law, and focuses on a
principal’s right to control the worker.28 Some of the factors for
finding employee status are whether the employer may direct the way
in which the work is performed, determine the hours involved, and
provide the employee with direction.29 On the other hand, elements
that lean toward independent contractor classification include highskilled work, workers providing their own equipment, workers setting
their own schedules, and workers getting paid per project, not per
hour.30 In an alternate test, courts examine the economic realities of
the relationship to determine whether the worker is exhibiting
entrepreneurial activity or whether the worker is financially
dependent upon the employer.31
The label affixed to the
relationship is a factor in the outcome, but it is certainly not
dispositive. In any event, the tests are notoriously malleable, difficult,
and fact-dependent, even when dealing with what should be a fairly
straightforward analysis.32
& LAB. L. 251, 257–58 (2006) (listing factors from the cases); see also Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326–27 (1992) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s test,
describing it as circular and non-predictive, and discussing with approval the test that
“turns on factual variables within an employer’s knowledge, thus permitting
categorical judgments about the ‘employee’ status of claimants with similar job
descriptions”); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947)
(explaining that when workers complete tasks as though they are employees, the
workers are protected as though they are employees even if the employer labels the
workers independent contractors); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398
F.2d 167, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussing employee classification within the
context of the respondeat superior doctrine).
28. See Stone, supra note 27, at 262, 280 (describing the “common law agency test”).
29. See, e.g., Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299,
303 (5th Cir. 1998).
30. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law
Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996) (“Most
labor and employment laws assume a paradigmatic relationship between an
‘employer’ and ‘employee.’ The employer in this model contracts directly with an
individual employee to perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to
the employer’s actual or potential supervision over the employee’s method, manner,
time and place of performance. This model describes most workers well enough, but
there has always been a large pool of workers in alternative relationships with
recipients of services. Some workers are ‘independent contractors’ who contract to
perform specific tasks or achieve particular results, but who retain independence and
self-management over their performance.”).
31. Stone, supra note 27, at 257–58.
32. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001)
(“Indeed, in the case of employee status, the law encourages ambiguity. On the one
hand, employers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment
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C. The Uber Litigation and Settlement
Many commentators hoped disputes over worker classification
would end, or at least be shaped by, the wage and hour lawsuits
within platform companies that have been pending in the Northern
District of California.33 In the largest of these suits, O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc.,34 over 400,000 drivers for the popular ridesharing
service were certified as a class to seek employee status and redress
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)35 for minimum wages and
overtime pay.36 In May 2016, however, O’Connor settled for a $100
million payment to the workers and an agreement that workers would
receive a hearing before an arbitrator prior to dismissal.37 While this
was a brokered compromise, the settlement failed to bring about any
definitive resolution to the classification problem.38 As of the present
writing, the court rejected the settlement as inadequate, and the
parties are continuing to negotiate.39
Throughout the litigation, the judges struggled to characterize these
working relationships within the “on/off” toggle of employee status.40

relationship. On the other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers
who are plausibly not employees motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable
‘non-employee’ classification. It is not uncommon to find employees and putative
contractors sitting side by side, performing the same work without any immediately
visible distinguishing characteristics. And the trend of the working world is toward
greater complexity and variation, driven partly by the temptation to capitalize on the
fog that obscures the essence of many working relationships.” (footnotes omitted)).
33. See Cherry, supra note 1, at 578.
34. No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
36. O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *37.
37. Having the claims for dismissal heard by an arbitrator was an important
aspect of the settlement. Many Uber drivers complained that they were disconnected
from the platform because of a complaint or because their customer ratings dropped
below a certain threshold. Many felt that these dismissals were arbitrary and
particularly cruel because of their automated nature. ALEX ROSENBLAT & LUKE STARK,
UBER’S DRIVERS: INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES AND CONTROL IN DYNAMIC WORK 12
(2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686227.
38. Miriam A. Cherry, Gig Economy: Settlement Leaves Legal Issues Unsettled, LAW360
(May 5, 2016, 10:26 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/791341/gig-economysettlements-leave-labor-issues-unsettled.
39. Jon Weinberg, Gig News: Federal Judge Rejects Uber Settlement, ON LABOR (Sept. 8,
2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/09/08/gig-news-federal-judge-rejects-uber-settlement.
40. Again, this has been a longstanding problem. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Employment
Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (identifying
new ways of working that challenge the current legal system, including new
employment relationships, such as temporary workers placed by an agency and parttime employees treated as contingent workers, and “ways of working that are not,
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Regarding Uber, some of the factors in the control test point toward an
employee relationship while others are reminiscent of an independent
contractor relationship.41 On the one hand, crowdworkers—who can
readily sign on and off their platform apps based on availability and
desire to work—have more control over their own schedules than do
traditional employees with set shifts or duty stations, such as a workplace
desk or factory floor.42 Additionally, crowdworkers must provide their
own tools, including cars, computer equipment, Internet access, and
mobile phones.43 Further, end user license agreements (EULAs) label
crowdworkers as “independent contractors” and force them to click “I
agree” in order to proceed with work.44
On the other hand, many factors lean toward an employment
relationship. Control may be high, given that companies like Uber
use customer ratings to maintain almost a constant surveillance over
workers. Uber has essentially deputized its customers to manage the
workforce and make detailed reports on how service is provided.45 In
fact, many on-demand companies spend significant time and effort
implementing quality control policies.46 With low-skilled and lowpaid crowdwork, the opportunity for entrepreneurship—and, with it,
risk-and-reward—is barely, if at all, present. Further, the terminology
in a EULA is far from dispositive, as such online contracts are known
to be extremely one-sided and are construed against the drafter.
Although courts have yet to develop a clear formulation of which of,
and to what extent, these factors are determinative, it is clear that the
greatest possibility of exploitation falls on low-skilled workers who are
most in need of FLSA protections.
The above factors and resulting issues left the judges in the
Northern District of California with a malleable test and an
indeterminate legal outcome.47 With the uncertainty of the jury
looming, both sides in Cotter v. Lyft48 and O’Connor would have taken a
significant risk by proceeding with a trial. Given the incentive
structure of settlements and payments to plaintiffs’ class action
attorneys, and the presence of arbitration clauses in the EULAs,
technically, ‘employment’ relations under any statute [such as] independent
contractors, free-lancers, [and] consultants”).
41. Means & Seiner, supra note 13, at 1516–17; Rodgers, supra note 13, at 98–99.
42. Cherry, supra note 38.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 37, at 11–12.
46. Cherry, supra note 38.
47. Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
48. 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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perhaps settlement in these cases was inevitable.49 The drivers in
O’Connor, however, stood only to recover small or nominal payments,
which led the court to reject that version of the settlement.50 While
we will have to wait and see what the parties and the court decide,
what is certain is that the initial question of whether the workers are
misclassified as independent contractors is left unresolved.
Notwithstanding the settlement, a government agency (like the
Internal Revenue Service), a worker’s compensation board, or an
unemployment agency could determine that these workers are
actually employees; in fact, some agencies already have.51
II. RECENT PROPOSALS FOR A THIRD CATEGORY FOCUSED ON THE GIG
ECONOMY
As litigation over worker misclassification lawsuits continues in
various U.S. jurisdictions, there have been corresponding calls to
create a hybrid category situated between employee and independent
contractor status. If such a third category were to exist, proponents
argue that the dilemmas surrounding proper worker classification
would conveniently disappear.52 Having an intermediate category for
gig workers would provide certainty and stability to businesses
implementing a crowdsourcing model. Proponents claim that the
third category would have advantages for gig workers as well, who
would at least receive some portion of the benefits that accrue to
employees. These proposals all seem to be focused on the gig
economy and creating a special carve out.
Proponents cite
innovation and the novelty of these forms of work and organization
as a reason for special treatment. The argument is that innovative
business models cannot survive if overly regulated.53 Many of the calls
49. On the role of arbitration clauses in the O’Connor v. Uber settlement, see
Katherine V.W. Stone, The Uber Litigation Shows How the Company Gets Around
Employment Laws, ALTERNET (May 24, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/labor/uberlitigation-shows-how-company-gets-around-employment-laws.
50. See Weinberg, supra note 39.
51. Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a
Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/busine
ss/uber-contests-california-labor-ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html.
52. See SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR
LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 5 (2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_fi
rst_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf.
53. Note that this trope is certainly not limited to technology businesses in
Silicon Valley or recent events in the gig economy. Businesses for years have
criticized regulations for stifling innovation.

CHERRYALOISI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/13/2017 6:35 PM

“DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS” IN THE GIG ECONOMY

647

for a third category originated in Silicon Valley; however, these
proposals create a third category that, while called something
different, virtually mirrors independent contractors.54
Intuitively appealing, a third category would resolve many of the
ongoing disputes over misclassification plaguing the on-demand
sector. Rather than litigate the issue of whether a particular worker
or group of workers deserves employee status, gig workers would
automatically be sorted into the hybrid “dependent contractor”
category.55 This would eliminate the uncertainty that goes along with
litigation connected to the “all or nothing” scheme and, at least, offer
some labor protection to workers who “present only some
characteristics of ‘employees’ but not others.”56 However, media
stories and blog posts have debated the third category and its
possibilities, and the conclusions are mixed. For example, a news
story in the Wall Street Journal discussed the advantages of creating a
new third category.57 A writer for the Washington Post also discussed
the possibility of a third category but ended critically, noting that gig
workers were unlikely to receive the protection they needed through
an intermediate category. Likewise, in a series of blog posts debating
the merits of creating a third category, Professor Benjamin Sachs has
approached the concept with some skepticism.58

54. “At a recent on-demand economy event, Simon Rothman, a venture capitalist
and advisor to companies like Lyft and Taskrabbit, said, ‘I think it’s not 1099 versus
W-2. I think the right answer is a third class of worker.’” Caroline Donovan, What a
New Class of Worker Could Mean for the Future of Labor, BUZZFEED NEWS, (June 18, 2015,
5:01 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/meet-the-new-workersame-as-the-old-worker.
55. See Guy Davidov et al., The Subjects of Labor Law: “Employees” and Other Workers
16 (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 15-15,
2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561752 (describing the unsatisfactory pace of
litigation that leads to legislatures considering adding a third group of workers).
56. Id. at 14.
57. See Lauren Weber, What if There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/whatif-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831 (highlighting
benefits such as control over payment and wage rates and the ability to negotiate
work contracts).
58. Benjamin Sachs, A New Category of Worker for the On-Demand Economy?, ON
LABOR (June 22, 2015), https://onlabor.org/2015/06/22/a-new-category-of-workerfor-the-on-demand-economy (arguing that a “dependence” test will not cover many
of the workers that a third category is designed to protect); Benjamin Sachs, Do We
Need an “Independent Worker” Category?, ON LABOR (Dec. 8, 2015),
https://onlabor.org/2015/12/08/do-we-need-an-independent-worker-category
(arguing that Uber drivers can be classified as employees under current law and that
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Recently, two in-depth studies called for the creation of a third
category. The first was a report sponsored by the Hamilton Project, a
subsidiary of the Brookings Institute.59 Written by former Deputy
Secretary of Labor Seth Harris and Princeton economist Alan
Krueger,60 the report advocates the creation of a hybrid category as a
The proposal terms this category
default for gig workers.61
“independent worker.”62 Under the report’s proposal, all gig
economy workers would default into this “independent worker”
status.63 Interestingly, while arguing that weak independent workers
deserve better benefits and protections, the report asserts that
neither the platforms nor the customers could be considered
employers as they are in a triangular relationship with the
independent workers.64 Paradoxically, this argument leads to the
logical conclusion that there is no employer present whatsoever, a
proposition that other authors have strongly disputed.65
Under the Hamilton Project proposal, such “independent workers”
would gain rights to organize and bargain collectively under the
National Labor Relations Act66 and would also gain antidiscrimination protections under Title VII.67 However, the proposal

the current legal framework is sufficient to deal with the “work time” issue by
tracking a driver’s time spent driving to and transporting a customer).
59. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52.
60. Krueger carried out this study independently but has also previously coedited a study commissioned by Uber. See JONATHON HALL & ALAN KRUEGER, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MARKET FOR UBER’S DRIVER-PARTNERS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-static/comms/PDF/Uber_Driver-Partners_
Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf.
61. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 5.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 9 (explaining that intermediaries create a platform or
communication channel but do not assign customers to workers). But see O’Connor
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141–42 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining that
Uber does not only serve as a communication channel, nor does it “simply sell
software; it sells rides” and “Uber simply would not be a viable business entity without
its drivers”); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(explaining that Lyft “markets itself to customers as an on-demand ride service, and
it actively seeks out those customers” and provides drivers with “detailed instruction
on how to conduct themselves”).
65. See Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as
Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619,
620, 646 (2016) (arguing for a flexible approach to defining an “employer” based on
a functional analysis of a potential employer).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 17–18.
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excludes payment for overtime and minimum wage arrangements
because—at least according to Harris and Kreuger—the gig economy
business model does not allow for tracing hours in a precise way or
even attributing hours to a particular platform.68 Further, the
Hamilton Project claims that an hours-based rate of pay does not
make sense when dealing with work paid by the gig.69 Other
commentators have criticized this stance for ignoring the role of big
data in the on-demand economy.70 They argue that if anything, the
gig economy enables constant tracking of workers’ data, allowing for
far better calculations of time and work performed than any previous
form of work ever could.71
The second proposal, from business law professor Abbey Stemler,
will appear in the Fordham Urban Law Journal.72 Titled “Betwixt and
Between: Regulating the Shared Economy,” Stemler advocates for
the creation of new legislation to address multiple aspects of the ondemand economy, including fraud, safety, and privacy. In terms of
labor rights, Stemler advocates for creating a hybrid category between
employee and independent contractor. As she puts it,
Instead of classifying Uber drivers and other supply-side users in
the sharing economy as either employees or independent
contractors, regulators should create a new classification. This new
classification has been identified as “dependent contractors,” or for
the purposes of this Article “microbusiness”—workers who fall
between clear-cut employees and traditional independent
contractors. This new classification would enable regulators to
think differently about how to fill regulatory gaps.73

While a footnote references the Canadian experience with
dependent contractors, it is only a passing reference. The article
does not devote any background or in-depth discussion to the
historical or international origins of the category.

68. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 2.
69. Id. at 13.
70. Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Uber Business Model Does Not Justify a New
“Independent Worker” Category, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.epi.org/
publication/uber-business-model-does-not-justify-a-new-independent-worker-category
(arguing that Harris and Krueger’s analysis was flawed because they ignore Uber’s
data collection methodology).
71. Matthew Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 49, 63 (Saint Louis
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 2016-6, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2769980.
72. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (2016).
73. Id. at 61–62.
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On the political front, Senator Mark Warren of Virginia has
recently begun discussing the need for legislation to address some of
the issues surrounding gig-work.74 A recent message from his office
noted that many younger Americans were finding themselves working
at multiple gigs without benefits.75 This type of arrangement is
reasonable when all goes well, but if there is a problem, many
workers—who would be without health benefits, unemployment, or
worker’s compensation—could find themselves without a safety net.
As the statement continued, “While litigation is underway about
whether on-demand workers are independent contractors or
employees, this question is too important to leave to the courts alone.
As policymakers, we should begin discussing whether our 20thcentury definitions work in a 21st-century economy.”76 In other
words, regardless of how the doctrinal legal questions around worker
misclassification are worked out within the court system, Senator
Warren proposes that the problems of the gig economy might be
better addressed through legislative action.
III. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
To date, the recent calls to establish a third category of “dependent
contractor” have focused only on the present state of the gig
economy. Likewise, these calls have been centered almost wholly on
the United States, where many popular crowdwork services were
created. Situating the “dependent contractor” category within a
historical and global context, however, we note that other countries
have already experimented with an intermediate category and have
seen various and mixed results. Granted, these legal reform efforts
pre-dated the platform economy, but these approaches arose in
response to a perceived lack of coverage by the binary switch of
employee status. In this Part, we compare the experiences of Canada,
Italy, and Spain, respectively. Our goal is to learn from context and
experience, capitalizing on those elements of the third category that
were successful and avoiding the aspects of those systems that worked
poorly. We begin with the Canadian experience.

74. Mark Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, MARK R. WARNER
(June 19, 2015), http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsclips?Cont
entRecord_id=9ec95aab-a96c-4dd5-8532-b45667013d2e.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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A. The Canadian Experience: Professor Harry Arthurs and “Dependent
Contractors”
Historically, Canadian law used the term “employee” as a gateway to
coverage, employing the binary employee/independent contractor
distinction.77 As most statutory definitions of “employee” in Canadian
statutes were circular and unhelpful,78 the starting point for most analyses
was the control test, which evolved under the principle of vicarious liability
for torts.79 In 1947, the well-known case Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive
Works80 supplemented the traditional control test used in Canada with a
“fourfold” test analyzing “(1) control; (2) ownership of the tools; (3)
chance of profit; [and] (4) risk of loss.”81 As one commentator has put it,
these are “merely different ways of expressing the same ultimate question
of ‘whose business is it?’”82 and they bear a similarity to the
“entrepreneurial activities test” developed in the United States.83
The doctrine around employee status took an interesting turn with
the Canadian adoption of the concept of “dependent contractor.”
The development of the category is largely due to the efforts of one
law professor, Harry Arthurs. Professor Arthurs, one of the leading
academics of Canadian labor law, wrote about the problem of
misclassification in a now-classic 1965 law review article.84 The third
category was certainly not Arthurs’ invention out of whole cloth,
however. Indeed, he claimed to have come across the idea of

77. Judy Fudge et al., Employee or Independent Contractor? Charting the Legal
Significance of the Distinction in Canada, 10 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193, 193 (2003).
78. Id. at 209; see Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c 1, sch. A, s. 1 (Can.)
(defining employee as “includ[ing] a dependent contractor,” and defining
dependent contractor as one whose working relationship “more closely resembl[es
that] of an employee than that of an independent contractor”).
79. See 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983,
999 (Can.) (discussing policy justifications for imposing vicarious liability in the case
of an employee but not an independent contractor based on the control test).
80. [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (Can.).
81. Id. at 169.
82. See Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors:
A View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 21 (1999); Sagaz Industries Canada, Inc.,
[2001] 2 S.C.R. at 1001; see also Fudge et al., supra note 77, at 199 (noting that during the
course of the twentieth century, Canadian courts stopped looking only at the issue of
control and developed the more complex fourfold test).
83. Sagaz Industries Canada, Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. at 1001 (“It has been suggested
that a fourfold test would in some cases be more appropriate, a complex involving
(1) control; (2) ownership of the tools; (3) chance of profit; (4) risk of loss. Control
in itself is not always conclusive.”).
84. Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of
Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 89 (1965).
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another category while studying Swedish labor law.85 Regardless of its
provenance, Arthurs seized on the idea of a third category of
“dependent contractors” as a reaction to a trend he was seeing
increasingly in the labor markets that created injustice for certain
groups of Canadian workers.86
Professor Arthurs’ article noted that small tradespeople, artisans,
plumbers, craftsmen, and the like were increasingly structuring
themselves as separate business entities.87 Yet, despite setting up shop
as separate companies, and thus falling outside the traditional purview
of “employees,” these tradespeople had no other employees but the
one worker-owner.88
Further, these tradespeople would work
effectively full-time for one company that paid them a retainer for all
of their services and time.89 As a matter of economic reality, Arthurs
noted that these putative independent businesses were often almost
wholly dependent on the patronage of the larger company.90 These
ostensible business owners had little in the way of control and would
often stand or fall on the continued business from the larger company.
As such, Arthurs argued that the law did these small business
people an injustice in ruling them outside of the bounds of the
traditional labor relationship.91
In fact, he argued, such
businesspeople were economically dependent upon a large company
in virtually the same subordinate position as an employee.92 The two
situations were so analogous, he argued, that employee-like
protections should apply: “Insofar as dependent contractors share a
particular labour market with employees . . . they should be eligible
for unionization.”93 Arthurs reasoned persuasively that these workers
should truly be called “dependent contractors.”94 He then argued

85. Id. at 89, n.1. Arthurs relied on the work of Axel Adelcreutz, The Definition of
an Employee 54, in THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (Folke Schmidt ed.,
1962). In fact, the Swedish law is somewhat murkier as later noted by another
author. See Källström, supra note 5, at 164 (stating that a characteristic of Swedish
law is the absence of “statutory categorization of employees”).
86. Arthurs, supra note 84, at 89.
87. Id.
88. Id. (listing occupations that have no other employers except the one workerowner, thus “personify[ing] the dependent contractor”).
89. See id. at 114.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 89.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 114.
94. Id. at 89.
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that this group should be included within the definition of employees
and that employee protections should be extended to them.95
If devising a new application of the third category in Canada and
highlighting the struggle of small tradespeople was all Professor
Arthurs had done, that still would have been a worthwhile effort. But
the influence of his article spread far beyond academic circles. As the
court in Fownes Construction Co. v. Teamsters Local Union 21396 noted,
Arthurs’ article truly “had an impact on the real world.”97 Arthurs’
influence was such that the concept of “dependent contractor”
became established within Canadian Law during the 1970s.98 The
effect was, in the words of subsequent commentators, “beneficial for a
significant number of workers formerly excluded from the ambit of
collective bargaining laws.”99 In effect, Arthurs’ academic work
resulted in substantial law reform and an extension of employment
laws to a previously subordinate group that had few protections.100
Even a critic of the third category, who largely viewed it as
superfluous, still credited Professor Arthurs with instigating a rapid
process of legal change.101
95. Id. (“They are often economically vulnerable as individuals because of the
dominance of a monopoly buyer or seller of their goods or services, or because of
disorganized market conditions. If viewed as ‘independent contractors’ rather than
‘employees’ they lack the legal status which is a prerequisite to the right to bargain
collectively under labour relations legislation. As businessmen, they cannot legally
employ collective tactics to buy or sell or otherwise stabilize conditions because of the
combines legislation. They are prisoners of the régime of competition.”).
96. 1974 CarswellBC 641 (Can. B.C. Labour Relations Board) (WL).
97. Id. at para. 12.
98. See Langille & Davidov, supra note 82, at 25 (“During the 1970s, most Canadian
jurisdictions adopted ‘dependent contractor’ provisions to include such workers within
the definition of ‘employee’ for collective bargaining purposes.”); Michael Bendel, The
Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in Canadian Labour Law, 32
U. TORONTO L.J. 374, 376 (1982) (“Although the notion of the dependent contractor
did not surface in Canada until 1965, concern for his status had become part of the
conventional wisdom on labour relations by the early 1970s. Between 1972 and 1977
seven jurisdictions in Canada adopted legislation to grant dependent contractors
employee status under their labour relations legislation.”).
99. Langille & Davidov, supra note 82, at 26.
100. PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS 30 n.19 (1969); COMM’R MAXWELL COHEN, REPORT
OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LABOUR LEGISLATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
243–46 (1972).
101. Bendel, supra note 98, at 378 (“[I]t seems safe to assume that all these
amendments were inspired, in part at least, by the recommendations of Professor
Arthurs and the task force to the effect that labour relations laws should be extended
to persons who are not regarded as employees . . . but who shared the employees’
economic dependence on the persons for whom they worked.”).
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Over time the government “introduced this intermediate category
into statutes in order to extend the reach of the statute beyond
typical employees.”102 For example, the 1995 Ontario Labour
Relations Act103 defined “employee” to include a “dependent
contractor” and a dependent contractor to be
a person, whether or not employed under a contract of
employment, and whether or not furnishing tools, vehicles,
equipment, machinery, material, or any other thing owned by the
dependent contractor, who performs work or services for another
person for compensation or reward on such terms and conditions
that the dependent contractor is in a position of economic
dependence upon, and under an obligation to perform duties for,
that person more closely resembling the relationship of an
employee than that of an independent contractor.104

The gig economy in Canada has yet to achieve the same market
saturation as it has in the United States, and, as a consequence, there
has been little legal adjudication as of the date of this writing. We
might have expected Uber, as one of the more dominant gig
economy companies, to have asserted itself as aggressively in Canada
as it has in many U.S. cities. But Uber is largely an urban
phenomenon, and its growth in the larger Canadian cities seems to
have been stymied by wrangling with municipal governments in
Toronto, Calgary, and Edmonton over insurance and driver licensure
requirements.105 Uber operates sporadically in Edmonton and
Calgary because of its uncertain legal status.106 On May 4, 2016, the
Toronto City Council ultimately voted to allow Uber to operate after
a protracted series of negotiations and legal wrangling.107

102. DAVID J. DOOREY, THE LAW OF WORK: COMMON LAW AND THE REGULATION OF
WORK 24 (2016).
103. Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c 1, sch. A, s. 1 (Can.).
104. Id.
105. John Rieti, Toronto Uber Regulations May Match Those in Edmonton, Ottawa, CBC
NEWS (Apr. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/uberregulations-canada-1.3524429.
106. Id. For an interesting viewpoint, see Jerry Dias, Letting Uber Break the Law
Legalizes the Underground Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2016, 4:52 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/jerry-dias/uber-canada-controversy_b_9252656.html
(arguing that Uber must compete on the same level, with the same regulations, as
existing taxicab companies).
107. The Canadian Press, Uber to Be Legal in Toronto After City Council Vote,
HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (May 4, 2016, 1:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016
/05/04/uber-gets-green-light-from-city-council-to-operate-legally-intoronto_n_9840722.html. For a flavor of some of the litigation over these issues, see
Abdullah v. Naziri, 2016 CanLII 2168, para. 57 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (dismissing
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The labor issues around platform work have yet to be heard by a
Canadian court or adjudicative body. As such, predictions are
inherently uncertain. But it does seem that the “dependent
contractor” category, and accordingly expansive definition of
“employee,” will make it more likely that gig economy workers will
gain access to labor protections. Analogous cases involving drivers of
taxicabs, limousines, and cars for hire have largely resulted in
findings of employee status. For example, drivers working on a parttime basis were held to be employees for purposes of the Canadian
collective bargaining legislation and, as such, enjoyed the protective
right to organize.108 Similar cases finding employee status for parttime drivers in Canada have been decided in the context of minimum
wage109 and workers’ compensation.110 Of course, each of these cases,
like all cases dealing with employee status, looked very carefully at the
individualized work arrangements of the drivers, their shifts, the
dispatch policies, and other factors in order to determine whether
these individuals were dependent contractors under Canadian law.
One concern with finding Uber drivers and other gig workers to be
“dependent contractors” is that the “dependent contractor” definitions
in Canadian law focus on the concept of economic dependency on a
single company.111 In an instance where a driver performed services
for multiple online platforms or perhaps was only using gig work as a
supplement to income from other employment, the definition might
not provide coverage. But as Uber and other companies have
increasingly pushed workers into standard shifts that preclude the
possibility of employment on other platforms, workers become more
likely to fit within the definition of “dependent contractor.”
Ultimately, in Canada the third category of “dependent contractor”
has essentially resulted in an expansion of the definition of employee.
The earlier tests had been too rigid and made it difficult for small
taxicab union’s motion for a preliminary injunction, given that the City Council
would be taking action on the issue of the Uber driver’s licensure and insurance
requirements); Edmonton (City) v. Uber Can., Inc., 2015 ABQB 214, para. 24–25
(Can. Alta.) (finding that Uber Canada does not require a business license).
108. This comparison was drawn in Ontario Taxi Workers’ Union v. Hamilton Cab,
2011 CanLII 7282, para. 35 (Can. O.N.L.R.B.): “The single plate owner/lessee
operators and the drivers are both economically dependent upon Hamilton Cab,
notwithstanding the fact that neither receives compensation from it (other than the
charge account fares paid by Hamilton Cab to the owner/lessee operators).”
109. Castegar Taxi (1988) Ltd. v. Director of Employment Standards, 1991 CanLII
1088 (Can. B.C.S.C.).
110. Decision No. 934/98, 2000 ONWSIAT 3346, para. 6 (CanLII).
111. Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c 1, sch. A, s. 1 (Can.).
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business workers to claim benefits and protections. The category was
enacted to help those workers who were essentially working on their
own in a position of economic dependency, thus requiring labor
protections. The expansive and inclusive protection of Canadian
labor law may help legislators, law professors, and commentators as
they evaluate current proposals for a third category in the on-demand
economy in the United States.
B. The Italian Case: Unintended Consequences and Arbitrage of the
Categories
The Italian system of worker classification originated in the ancient
Roman Law notion of “locatio operarum” (right to control the worker)
and “locatio operis” (contract for a specific result).112 This dichotomy was
translated into the two categories of independent contractor and
employee (in Italian, “subordinate worker”) in the Civil Code of 1942,113
with those categories still in force today.114 A fundamental binary divide
applies: only the employee is the subject of the labor laws, and most
workers are considered employees.115 Article 2094 of the Civil Code
(contract of service) covers employees but contains a vague definition:
“a subordinate employee is a person who binds himself, for a
remuneration, to cooperate in the enterprise by contributing his
intellectual or manual work, in the employment and under the
management of the [entrepreneur].”116 The provision allows for the
implementation of a hierarchical structure, enabling the employer to
organize work activities and to react to insubordination. According to
article 2104 of the Civil Code, the employee has to observe the
entrepreneur’s directions while performing work tasks.117 As building

112. The Roman distinction was between locatio conductio operarum, which refers to
the classic master and servant contract and implies the right to control and
encompasses respondeat superior, and locatio conductio operis, which was based on the
production of a specific result. See generally WILLIAM BURDIK, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN
LAW AND THEIR RELATIONS TO MODERN LAW 447, 450 (2d ed. 2004); Matthew Finkin,
Introduction, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1 (1999).
113. R.D. 16 marzo 1942, n.262, in G.U. 4 aprile 1942, n.79 (It.).
114. C.c. arts. 2094, 2222, translated in THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE AND
COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION 444, 474 (Susanna Beltramo ed., trans., 2012)
[hereinafter ITALIAN CIVIL CODE] (giving statutory definitions for subordinate
employee and independent labor contract).
115. STEFANO LIEBMAN, ILO NAT’L STUDIES, EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS AND WORKERS’
PROTECTION, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---dialogue
/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205366.pdf.
116. C.c. art. 2094, translated in ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 444.
117. C.c. art. 2104, translated in ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 446.
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blocks of the employment relationship, the jurisprudence adopted the
concept of “collaboration” or “co-working”—i.e., the prolonged
availability or continuance of the relationship and technical and
structural subordination of the employee—and “dependence,” a socioeconomic concept, to mean that the assets and tools of the business
belong to the employer. These elements are considered the “legal
distinctive feature of both subordination and employment contract.”118
The definition of “employee” under article 2094 of the Civil Code
of 1942 has been widely criticized because of its vagueness.119
According to Professor Lodovico Barassi, one of the great scholars of
Italian labor law, the distinctive element of “contract of employment”
(literally “contratto di lavoro”) concept was “eterodirezione,” which means
managerial and disciplinary powers; for example, the ability of the
employer (conductor operarum) to modify the content of the
contractual relationship unilaterally.120
Managerial power is a
hallmark of employee status because it allows for internal flexibility;
i.e., the possibility of rearranging, even on a daily basis, an
employee’s duties within the business.121
Other scholars have since grappled with this concept. Although
the bedrock of eterodirezione came from Roman law—as a hierarchical
description of the relationship122—the label was unable to describe
comprehensively the complexity of the employee category and the
idea of worker dignity. Scholars realized that eterodirezione was an
incomplete concept and thus developed other theories to explain the
employment relationship.123 One line of thought developed the
concept of socio-economic inferiority of the worker “who is

118. Orsola Razzolini, The Need to Go Beyond the Contract: “Economic” and “Bureaucratic”
Dependence in Personal Work Relations, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 267, 270 (2010).
119. Michele Tiraboschi & Maurizio Del Conte, Employment Contract: Disputes on
Definition in the Changing Italian Labour Law, in 1 JILPT REPORT, THE MECHANISM FOR
ESTABLISHING AND CHANGING TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT/THE SCOPE OF
LABOR
LAW
AND
THE
NOTION
OF
EMPLOYEES
153
(2004),
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/no1.pdf.
120. Razzolini, supra note 118, at 269–70.
121. Id. at 269. Industrial relations at the time was conceived of as a way to further
the interest of workers through socialist ideology. Remarkably, Professor Barassi
wanted to distinguish the socio-economic background of capitalist employment from
the legal structure of the employment contract.
122. ADALBERTO
PERULLI,
ECONOMICALLY
DEPENDENT/QUASI-SUBORDINATE
(PARASUBORDINATE) EMPLOYMENT: LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 8, 30 (2002).
123. Razzolini, supra note 118, at 270.
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considered—legally and socially—to be the weaker party in the
contract,” but there was no precise threshold for this definition.124
Besides the eterodirezione or managerial power factor,125 the case law
developed a wide spectrum of subsidiary factors that could indicate the
presence of an employment relationship.126 A judge could disregard the
contractual label when the substance of the work relationship contained
legal indicia of subordination—the so-called “primacy of facts”
principle.127 The analysis includes a variety of factors: (1) the
requirement that the worker follow reasonable work rules, (2) the
length of relationship, (3) the respect of set working hours, (4) salaried
work, and (5) absence of risk of loss related to the production.128 The
test is multifactorial, and no single factor is dispositive.129
Turning to independent contractors, surprisingly, a definition does
not exist in Italian law. The self-employed worker contract is not a
part of the chapter of the Civil Code devoted to labor. Article 2222 of
the Civil Code, which governs businesses, defines “contratto d’opera”
(contract for service) as one carried out by a person who “binds
himself to perform a piece of work or render a service for
compensation, primarily by his own effort and without a relation of
subordination with respect to the principal.”130
Roughly speaking, general principles of civil and commercial law
apply to the self-employed worker—including some particularities
because human dignity is at stake—with the independent contractor
124. Adalberto Perulli, Subordinate, Autonomous and Economically Dependent Work: A
Comparative Analysis of Selected European Countries, in THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP:
A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 137, 138 (Giuseppe Casale ed., 2011).
125. Cass., sez. Lavoro, 22 novembre 1999, n.12,926, Foro it. I 2000, 123, 1, 75
(It.). Moreover, in order to prove a subordinate relationship, this power should
imply specific and well-defined directives rather than programmatic and vague
instructions because the latter’s are also compatible with the independent
contractor’s category. Their compatibility with autonomous work are not sufficient
for establishing an employment relationship.
126. Cass. sez. lav., 27 marzo 2000, n.3674 (“When an assessment of unambiguous
elements such as the exercise of the managerial and disciplinary power is not enough
to distinguish among employee and self-employed (being the presence of the two
powers a safe index of subordination, while its absence is not an indisputable sign of
autonomy) . . . .”).
127. Article 1362 of the Italian Civil Code provides that a contract must be
interpreted with regard to the common intention and the behavior of the parties,
and not merely to the literal meaning of its wording. C.c. art. 1362, translated in
ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 293.
128. Maurizio Del Conte, Lavoro autonomo e lavoro subordinato: la volontà e gli indici
di denotazione, in ORIENTAMENTI DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA DEL LAVORO 66 (1995).
129. Id.
130. C.c. art. 2222, translated in ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 474.
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considered “as substantially and formally equal to the
counterparty.”131 The statute operates by contrast, as it refers “a
contrario” to article 2094 of the Civil Code: independent work is
performed without subordination.132 Moreover, an independent
contractor relationship is supposed to eliminate economic
subordination.
However, the concrete content of the job
performance could be identical between an employee and an
independent contractor. The principle is that one could carry out
“every kind of labour for which payment is calculated, whether
intellectual or manual,” in either category.133 This confirms that, for
the purposes of the distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor, the core of the two definitions is the way in
which tasks are accomplished and structured.134
A leading case regarding misclassification by a courier service
highlights these principles.135 Despite the label the courier service
used to describe its workers in their contracts, the labor court ruled
that the worker was actually an employee on the basis of
socioeconomic dependence.136 The court reasoned that the delivery
driver was part of the economic and business organization of the
principal.137 An appellate court, however, subsequently deemed the
worker to be an independent contractor.138 The highest judicial
authority, Corte di Cassazione, agreed that the worker was an
independent contractor.139 The courier case demonstrates that in
labor cases, judges have considerable discretion to weigh the day-today facts on a case-by-case basis, notwithstanding Italy’s civil law
framework. More recently, however, courts have given greater
importance to the factual intentions of the parties, the so-called
131. See Perulli, supra note 124, at 138.
132. Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 154.
133. Id.; Cass., sez. Lavoro, 03 aprile 2000, n.4036.
134. Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 154.
135. It is surprising how after decades and in a very different context, the jobs—i.e.,
driving and courier service—are so similar to what is offered in the gig economy today.
136. Pret. Milano, 20 giugno 1986, Foro it. V 1987, 110, 7/8, 2264 (It.).
137. Id. at 2264 (“The work, performed by the biker assigned to pick up and
delivery and by using the own vehicle, has to be considered “subordinate,” in spite of
the length, the possibility of refusing to execute the request for the performance and
even in presence if of a monitoring activity (in radio contact).”).
138. Trib. Milano 10 ottobre 1987, in Riv. it. dir. lav., 1987, II, p. 688 (“The work,
performed by the biker assigned to pick up and delivery and by using the own
vehicle, has not to be considered ‘subordinate,’ in the absence of the critical
requirement of continuity. Those workers are not required to appear everyday at the
workplace and can refuse to execute the request for the performance.”).
139. Cass. 14 aprile 1989 n.5671 (mass.).
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“nomen iuris” (i.e., contractual label), expressed at the signature of
the contract.140 Subsequent elaboration made clear that workers
could have a considerable amount of autonomy—granted by general
and functional directives—yet still be classified as employees.
1.

The introduction of the legislation on “para-subordinazione”
The Italian case is instructive for our purposes because in 1973, the
legislature extended some protection to a tranche of self-employed
workers, planting the seeds of what later would become the intermediate
category of worker (literally “lavoratore parasubordinato” or “quasisubordinate”) situated between employee and independent contractor.
Italian Law 533/1973141 sought to extend certain procedural
protections to the weakest of the independent contractors and, perhaps
incidentally, brought about the genesis of the third category, deemed
lavoratore parasubordinato.142 Comprised of a subset of self-employed
workers, these lavoratore parasubordinato were distinguished as workers
“when the provision of the service presents itself as characterized, in
practice, by a predominantly personal activity of continuous and
coordinated collaboration.”143 Four “concurrent” factors need to be
present to denote this intermediate category: (1) collaboration, (2)
continuity and length of the relationship, (3) functional coordination
with the principal, and (4) a predominantly personal service.144 These
140. This idea could seem inconsistent with the multifactorial test aimed at
inferring the nature of the contract by analyzing the concrete ways in which the
overall performance is accomplished, disregarding the wording of the contracts
(“primacy of facts”). See Cass. 29 maggio 1996 n.4948, DPL 1996, 3338.
141. Legge 11 agosto 1973, n.533, Disciplina delle controversie individuali di
lavoro e delle controversie in materia di previdenza e di assistenza obbligatorie.
(G.U. 13 settembre 1973, n.237).
142. MARK FREEDLAND & NICOLA KOUNTOURIS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
PERSONAL WORK RELATIONS 122 n.61 (2011) (“The emergence of the notion of
parasubordinati in the Italian legal domain is traditionally linked to Law 533/1973, . . .
which prescribed that the rules of procedure for labour litigation also apply to the
‘relationship of agency, of commercial representation and other relations of
collaboration materialising in a continuous and coordinated provision,
predominantly personal, even if not of subordinate character.’”).
143. See NICOLA COUNTOURIS, THE CHANGING LAW OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 72–73 (2011) (“In
the context of parasubordinazione, the element collaboration differs from the one
applying in the context of standard dependent work under Article 2094 of the Italian
civil code and requires that a subordinated worker be one who commits himself to
‘collaborate in the enterprise.’”).
144. This element is listed among the causes of this legal tool as the difference
between managerial power (“eterodirezione”) and the notion of “coordination” seems
too subtle.
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quasi-subordinate workers were commonly called “co.co.co” as an
abbreviation for “continuous and coordinated collaborators.”145
The 1973 law did not, however, extend all the rights of employees
to quasi-subordinate workers. On the one hand, the protections
included access to labor courts.146 The effect of such access, however,
was limited and basically procedural as the quasi-subordinate workers
were still considered outside the scope of the substantive labor law.
Hiring a quasi-subordinate worker was much cheaper than hiring an
employee because employees were entitled to substantive labor
rights, annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave, other employee
benefits, overtime, and job security against unfair dismissal.147 The
1973 law did not grant quasi-subordinate workers any of these
substantive protections.
Nonetheless, the legislation was partly responsible for a relaxation
of the rigid employee/independent contractor dichotomy.
Remarkably, however, the 1973 law was not a reaction against
disguised employment relationships; conversely, “it is something
physiologically connected to certain kinds of economic organizations
that the law has to recognize and regulate.”148
The third category sparked undesirable effects within its first decade.
Businesses increasingly began to hire workers under the lavoratore
parasubordinato category.149 Most of these quasi-subordinate workers
would all previously have been classified as employees. Consequently, the
lavoratore parasubordinato category was used to hide bona fide employment
relationships in order to reduce costs and evade the protections workers
were entitled to under article 2094 of the Civil Code.
Over time, the result was employer arbitrage between the
categories.150 As a consequence, workers saw a “gradual erosion of
the protections afforded to employees through jobs that are
traditionally deemed to constitute master-servant relationships in the
strict sense[,] progressively entering the no man’s land of an

145. COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 72.
146. Legge 11 agosto 1973, n.533.
147. Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 156 (“[S]ome 90[%] of the two
and a half million quasi-subordinate workers actually work for just one ‘client,’ and
of these some 66% carry out their work on the client’s premises, often with working
hours and conditions that are no different to those of company employees working
alongside them.”).
148. Razzolini, supra note 118, at 296.
149. DE STEFANO, supra note 4, at 19.
150. Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali, Libro Bianco sul mercato del
lavoro in Italia, ottobre 2001, n.3.
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inadequately defined notion.”151 This state of affairs persisted for two
decades without intervention from the legislature. Towards the end
of the last century, the number of quasi-subordinate workers
increased dramatically.152 They were seen as a “low-cost” alternative
to stable employment relationships, especially because quasisubordinate workers are not afforded certain employment
protections that full-time employees enjoy.153 In 1995 with the
Pension Reform Act,154 the legislature did enact a modest
intervention by granting self-employed workers social security
contributions previously reserved for employees.155
In 2003, the legislature amended the content of the quasisubordinate category with Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 (the socalled Biagi Reform).156 To prevent the common practice of
businesses incorrectly classifying employees as quasi-subordinate
workers, the legislature required the collaboration between the
business and employee be linked to at least one “project.” Thus, a
new definition emerged for quasi-subordinate workers: “lavoro a
progetto” (i.e., project work, also “co.co.pro”).157 The legislature
intended the measure to verify the authenticity of the collaborations
and protect against businesses disguising employees as quasisubordinate.158 Under the updated law, the “accomplishment of a
specific project, programme or phase of production” was an
indispensable element for checking the validity of a project work
contract.159 These projects were required to be fixed term contracts
with a definite end date.160 If there was not an actual project—i.e.,
the work was continuous and managed by the business—the worker
could be reclassified into a standard employment contract and the
business would be liable for back pay.
151. LIEBMAN, supra note 115.
152. See Michele Tiraboschi, The Italian Labour Market After the Biagi Reform, 21
INT’L. J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 149, 153 (2005), http://adapt.it/adapt-indice-az/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Tiraboschi_Journal.pdf.
153. Ulrike Muehlberger & Silvia Pasqua, Workers on the Border Between Employment and
Self-Employment 3 (Int’l Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11/2006, 2006).
154. Legge 8 agosto 1995, n.335, Riforma del sistema pensionistico obbligatorio e
complementare. (GU n.190 del 16-8-1995 - Suppl. Ordinario n.101).
155. See Matteo Jessoula, A Risky Combination in Italy: ‘Selective Flexibility’ and Defined
Contributions Pensions, in LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND PENSION REFORMS: FLEXIBLE
TODAY, SECURE TOMORROW? 62, 83 (Karl Hinrichs & Matteo Jessoula eds., 2012).
156. D.L. n. 276/2003; see Tiraboschi, supra note 152, at 149.
157. See COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 77.
158. D.L. n. 276/2003; COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 77.
159. COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 77.
160. See id.
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However, the lavoro a progetto reduced the role of the continuity
and coordination elements of the original 1973 definition by
discouraging long-term employment and also limiting the managerial
influence over the quasi-subordinate worker.161 This modification
was supposed to counter-balance the contractual power of the
employer by defining in advance the details and conditions of the
project.162 The central aim of Law 276/2003 was to reduce the
number of precarious forms of employment leading to illicit work
and evasion of social insurance contributions.163 In addition to
requiring a linkage to a project, the legislature extended a series of
social security benefits for maternity, sick leave, and worker’s
compensation to quasi-subordinate workers.164 Professor Perulli
theorized that the quasi-subordinate group was only a “zone,” rather
than its own category or “tertium genus.”165 As a general policy
evaluation, a Green Paper issued by the Commission of the European
Communities in 2006 defined these reform efforts as “somewhat
tentative and partial,” although they expressed the will of the Italian
legislature “to tackle problems in this complex area.”166
Although the centrality of the notion of the project was greeted as
“the most innovative [and critical] element . . . in the legislative
decrees implementing the Biagi law,” the law was not as successful as
its proponents expected it would be.167 The Biagi law was criticized
161. See generally Riccardo Del Punta, La scomparsa dei co.co.co., LAVOCE.INFO (June
12, 2003), http://www.lavoce.info/archives/21781/la-scomparsa-dei-co-co-co.
162. See Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 155–56.
163. Gabriele Piazza & Martin Myant, Italy’s Labour Market Reforms of 2012: Did
They Reduce Unemployment? 8 (Eur. Trade Union Inst. Working Paper, 2015.11, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715566.
164. D.L. n. 276/2003.
165. See INT’L FED’N OF ACTORS, TACKLING DEPENDENT AND BOGUS SELF-EMPLOYMENT
IN THE LIVE PERFORMANCE AND MEDIA ENTERTAINMENT SECTORS 3 (2016), http://fiaactors.com/fileadmin/user_upload/News/Documents/2016/January/FINALDiscussion-Note-Ljubljana.pdf; ADALBERTO PERULLI, COMM. ON EMP’T & SOC. AFFAIRS,
STUDY ON ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT WORK/PARASUBORDINATE (QUASI-SUBORDINATE)
WORK 3, 5, 8 (2003), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20030619/empl/stu
dy_en.pdf.
166. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Modernising Labour
Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, at 12, COM (2006) 708 final (Nov. 22,
2006) [hereinafter Modernising Labour Law], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0708&from=EN.
167. Adalberto Perulli, Un Jobs Act per il lavoro autonomo: verso una nuova disciplina
della dipendenza economica?, (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Labour Law “Massimo
D’Antona,” Working Paper No. 235, 2015), http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/WP/
WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA-IT/
20150114-124113_perulli_n235-2015it-pdf.pdf.
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“for questionable techniques, the unsuitability of the selection
requirements,
deficient
protective
measures
and
the
inappropriateness of the severe yet inefficient sanction system.”168
Despite the legislature’s effort to safeguard the rights of quasisubordinate workers, their overall level of rights and protection
remained lower than those granted to employees.
In 2012, the Italian legislature passed Law No. 92/2012 (the socalled Monti-Fornero Reform)169 to counteract the misuse of the
“lavoro a progetto” definition by making employee status the default.170
For quasi-subordinate workers, businesses could no longer exercise or
interfere in the project worker’s autonomy; they could not exercise
managerial power over the day-to-day work.171 Moreover, the MontiFornero Reform stated that the project may not merely overlap with
the employer’s core business or consist merely of executing low-skilled
or routine duties.172 The law also granted a substantive set of rights to
the quasi-subordinate workers by requiring compensation compliant
with minimum compensation levels.173 The Monti-Fornero Reform
affirmed that, in the absence of a project, the worker was to be
considered an employee, backdated to the beginning of the
relationship. The intervention was one of several policies aimed at
promoting “a general reshaping of labour protection [to] . . .
counter[] the misuse of legal schemes already introduced in order to

168. Perulli, supra note 124.
169. Legge 28 giugno 2012, n.92, G.U. July 3, 2012, n.153 (Disposizioni in materia
di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita).
170. During this time, project workers were estimated at 3.2% of the employed, a
level that rose to 10.1% among the young, to 4.5% in the South, and to 3.8% among
women. Emiliano Mandrone et al., Is Decline in Employment the Outcome or Cause of
Crisis in Italy? 3, 7 (Astril Working Paper No. 7/2014, 2014),
http://www.astril.org/files/WP_7_2014_mandrone.pdf; see also Marco Biasi, The Effect
of the Global Crisis on the Labor Market: Report on Italy, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 371,
372–73, 381 (2014).
171. Michele Tiraboschi, Italian Labour Law After the So-Called Monti-Fornero Reform
(Law No. 92/2012), 1 E-JOURNAL OF INT’L & COMP. LAB. STUD. 48, 61–62 (2012);
Orsola Razzolini, La nuova disciplina delle collaborazioni organizzate dal committente. Prime
considerazioni 18 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Labour Law “Massimo D’Antona,”
Working Paper No. 266, 2015), http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/WP/WP%20CSDL
E%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA-IT/20150921-09333
1_razzolini_n266-2015itpdf.pdf.
172. Tiraboschi, supra note 171, at 62.
173. The law refers to levels set out by national collective bargaining agreements
for parasubordinate workers or consistent with minimum wage due to employees as
determined by collective agreements. See id. at 63.
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provide flexibility.”174 The Monti-Fornero Reform made it clear that
using the quasi-subordinate category was disfavoured and discouraged.
Not only did the cost of using workers in that category increase, the
reform also created burdensome regulations and bureaucracy.
Finally, the 2015 “Jobs Act”175 fundamentally eliminated the
concept of project work that had its genesis in the 2003 Biagi law.176
This change was intended to reduce the use of atypical contracts and
to establish as the default the “employee” classification. The trend of
eliminating the project work concept has been part of long-lasting
political action aimed at “moving as many employment contracts as
possible, in a gradual manner over a period of time, from the
uncertain grey area of atypical employment to the area of salaried
employment.”177 The legislature implemented incentives, including
funding of some employee benefits and liberalizing dismissal
requirements, which made classifying a worker as an employee a
more favoured option.178 While the quasi-subordinate category stills
exists, it is now limited in its scope as well as its protections, further
emphasizing the shift of workers into the employee category.179

174. Valerio De Stefano, A Tale of Oversimplification and Deregulation: The
Mainstream Approach to Labour Market Segmentation and the Recent Responses to the Crisis
in European Countries, 43 INDUS. L.J. 253, 264 (2014).
175. D.L. 15 giugno 2015, n.81, Disciplina organica dei contratti di lavoro e
revisione della normativa in tema di mansioni, a norma dell'articolo 1, comma 7,
della legge 10 dicembre 2014, n.183. (15G00095) (GU Serie Generale n.144 del 24-62015 - Suppl. Ordinario n.34).
176. See Gavin Jones & Francesca Piscioneri, Italy’s Renzi Completes Labour Reform,
Growth Needed for Jobs, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2016, 12:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/italy-economy-reform-idUSL5N11A2IE20150904. See generally Italy’s Jobs Act,
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, Dec. 2014, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowled
ge/publications/124079/italys-jobs-act.
177. Michele Tiraboschi, The Italian Labour Market After the Biagi Reform, 21 INT’L. J.
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 149, 170 (2005), http://adapt.it/adapt-indice-a-z/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Tiraboschi_Journal.pdf.
178. A monetary incentive was introduced that consisted of a reduction in the
contribution burden per employee. The measure is provided to businesses that are
willing to hire under a permanent contract of employment or transform other
existent contracts into permanent ones.
179. After June 2015, a worker could still enter a co.co.co contract, but the
legislature introduced this new notion of collaborations involving the
accomplishment of work that is “mainly” (not “exclusively”) personal and organized
in coordination with the principal. The most recent Italian labor market reform
could eventually provide a solution for the current disputes on how work in the gig
economy could be regulated. In fact, the scheme of collaborazioni organizzate dal
committente could represent a useful template because it broadens the scope of the
protections granted to standard employees. See Antonio Aloisi, Il Lavoro “A Chiamata” e le
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Essentially, the result is a return to the binary distinction of employee
and independent contractor. The legislature introduced a new
notion of “collaborations organized by the principal,” offering
scholars and courts a definition that raises many doubts as to
framework, boundaries and practical effects. The Jobs Act is still new
and has not been fully implemented, so we will need to wait to
determine what the impact will be for the classification question.180
2. Policy lessons from the Italian experience with the quasi-subordinate
category
For the past two decades, the story of the quasi-subordinate category in
Italy has been one of struggle, second-guessing, and revision. After its
promulgation, the third category became a discounted alternative to a
standard employment contract. Introducing a third category initially
resulted in arbitrage of the classifications and an increase in precarious
and non-standard work. That remained the case, up until 2015, in spite of
the gradual extension of protective measures through the reforms.
Businesses used the quasi-subordinate category as a way to hide what
should have been standard employees into a discounted status with fewer
rights and benefits. While the goal of the original legislation establishing
and supporting the quasi-subordinate category was to extend labor
protections and increase flexibility, those goals were never realized.
Instead, in 2015, the Jobs Act changed course by implementing a
strong presumption of employee status. In light of the serious
misuses of the quasi-subordinate category, the category itself has now
been minimized and discouraged.181 Unfortunately, in the words of
Professor Perulli, the history of the quasi-subordinate category is an
“unfortunate series of legislative interventions.”182 The third category
was not a panacea for the misclassification issue. Instead, the changes
created even more uncertainty for both businesses and workers.

Piattaforme Online Della “Collaborative Economy”: Nozioni e tipi Legali in Cerca di Tutele/OnDemand Work and Online Platforms in the Collaborative Economy, 2 LLI 2421 (2016).
180. Emanuele Dagnino & Pietro Manzella, Le Parole del Lavoro. Il Lavoro EteroOrganizzato: Una Sfida per i Comparatisti, BOLLETTINO ADAPT (Apr. 18, 2016),
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Parole_Lavoro_PM_
ED_15_04.pdf; see also Jones & Piscioneri, supra note 176.
181. See Adalberto Perulli, Il lavoro autonomo, le collaborazioni coordinate e le
prestazioni organizzate dal committente 3 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Labour Law
“Massimo D’Antona,” Working Paper No. 272, 2015), http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Arch
ive/WP/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTON
A-IT/20151015-010522_perulli_n272-2015itpdf.pdf.
182. Perulli, supra note 124, at 167.
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Turning to the gig economy itself, to date Italy has largely
considered ridesharing services under the auspices of fair
competition law. In 2015, the Tribunale di Milano banned Uber from
operating a service that resembled services provided by licensed and
regulated taxis.183 Italian courts have yet to make a determination
about the classification status of the drivers on ridesharing
platforms.184 More comprehensive regulation may be coming as
there was a proposal in March 2016 to regulate the sharing economy
This proposal, however, did not focus on the
in Italy.185
misclassification or labor issues. At the EU level, there is a movement
to harmonize legislation across Europe to become more attractive to
digital platforms and new economy companies.186 Nevertheless, the
EU is also concerned about these platforms disguising employment
relationships. As of the date of this Article, policymakers are just
beginning to study and debate various reforms and proposals.
C. An Economic Threshold for the Third Category: The Spanish Case
The Spanish Workers’ Act187 was passed in 1980, roughly ten years
after Italy had engaged in major legislative reform. This law, Estatuto
de los Trabajadores, covers only employees, defined as “those
individuals who voluntarily perform their duties, in exchange for
compensation, within the limits of the organisation and under the
directions of a natural or juridical person, referred to as employer or
entrepreneur.”188 Spanish independent contractors were left to
constitutional, civil, and commercial provisions of the law.189 Just like
the Italian and Canadian examples, the Spanish law started with a
183. Trib. Milano, 25 maggio 2015, Ordinanza nel procedimento cautelare iscritto
al N.16612/2015; Trib. Milano, sez. spec. impresa, ord., 9 luglio 2015; see, e.g., Alessio
Di Amato, Uber and the Sharing Economy, 2 ITALIAN L.J. 177, 177–80 (2016),
http://www.theitalianlawjournal.it/data/uploads/italj-vol-02-no-01-2016/10-di-amato
-177.pdf; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Uber Ordered to Discontinue Pop Service in Italy,
GUARDIAN (May 26, 2015, 1:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015
/may/26/uber-pop-italy-order-discontinue-unfair-competition-taxi; Danilo Masoni,
Italian Court Bans Unlicensed Taxi Services like Uber, REUTERS (May 26, 2015, 9:16 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-uber-idUSKBN0OB1FQ20150526.
184. Di Amato, supra note 183, at 178.
185. Atto Camera, Presentata il 27 gennaio 2016, n.3564, Jan. 27, 2016, n.3564 (It).
186. See generally Resolution on Action Towards a Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL. DOC.
2015/2147(INI) (2016).
187. Estatuto de los Trabajadores (B.O.E. 1980, 8) (Spain) de 10 de marzo 1980,
del, B.O.E. 1989.
188. Estatuto de los Trabajadores art. I.I (B.O.E. 1980, 8) (Spain) de 10 de marzo
1980, del, B.O.E. 1989.
189. Constitucion Espanola 27 diciembre 1978 (cited as Art. 40 C.E.).
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binary divide between independent contractor and employee status.
The rest of this section will describe the Spanish system and the 2007
reforms in more depth.
The traditional binary classification between employees and
independent contractors in Spain depended upon a determination of
self-organization as an exercise of contractual autonomy. Spanish
case law has interpreted the definition of an employee to be a
combination of two concurrent elements: (1) the exercise of
managerial power (“dirección”) and (2) how much autonomy the
workers have.190 Spanish legal scholars have focused on the element
of “alienness” (“ajenidad,” also defined as “ownership by another”) as
a factor in determining whether an individual is an employee.191
“Alienness” focuses on the allocation of risk and, consequently, the
ownership of “the means of production and the financial benefits
obtained by the company from the employee’s work.”192 As with
other jurisdictions, such as Italy and the United States, the
contractual label set by the parties is not dispositive. Rather, a
judicial assessment of the substance of the relationship (e.g., day-byday arrangements) is dispositive.193
More recently, Spanish case law has paid more attention to the
presence of a hierarchy and the organizational integration of the
employee—i.e., the presence of directorial/managerial power. Until
a few years ago, labor courts interpreted the definition of employee
expansively, using a default assumption of an employment
relationship.194 To determine whether an individual is an employee,
case law has analyzed the following concurrent elements: (1) the
level of integration within the organization; (2) the dependency
upon one employer; (3) fixed working time; (4) provision of

190. See generally Perulli, supra note 124, at 173–74.
191. See generally Ajenidad, ENCICLOPEDIA JURÍDICA, http://www.enciclopediajuridica.biz14.com/d/ajenidad/ajenidad.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
192. See Miguel Ramón Alarcón Caracuel, Dipendenza e alienità nella discussione
spagnola sul contratto di lavoro, in LAVORO SUBORDINATO E DINTORNI: COMPARAZIONI E
PROSPETTIVE 296 (1989); Perulli, supra note 124, at 173–74.
193. S.T.S., Dic. 29, 1999 (R.J. 2000, p. 1427) (Spain).
194. See Por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los
Trabajadores art. VIII.I (B.O.E. 1995, 1) (Spain) (“El contrato de trabajo . . . [s]e
presumirá existente entre todo el que presta un servicio por cuenta y dentro del
ámbito de organización y dirección de otro y el que lo recibe a cambio de una
retribución a aquél.”).
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professional tools and uniform; and (5) the extent of an employee’s
decision-making power.195
According to the government-funded research center EurWORK, in
Spain and many other European countries the independent contractor
category was used to hide bona fide employment relationships.196
Hiding employees as independent contractors was especially prevalent
in the building and construction sector of the economy.197 Both large
and medium businesses in the construction industry resorted to
subcontracting for tasks “that demanded relatively low levels of skills
and qualification and were easily controllable.”198 Over time, the
growth towards a “new generation” of self-employment (freelance
consulting, for example) accelerated because recruiting self-employed
workers was more convenient than hiring employees. Self-employed
workers were further desirable because businesses wanted to mobilize
and de-mobilize their workforces rapidly to ensure a certain degree of
flexibility and fluidity.
These trends caused concern among Spanish labor groups and the
government. In 1995, Spanish social partners “Confederacion Sindacal
de Consumes Obrera” (“CCOO”), “Union General de Trabajadores,”
(“UGT”), and the Government jointly signed the Toledo Compact
(“Pacto de Toledo”), criticizing the absence of legislation governing
independent contractors.199 Five years later, the European Council of
Lisbon (2000) envisioned a plan to shape a more competitive social
Europe.200 Subsequently, in 2002, a trade union proposed the
widening of rights for independent contractors who were
economically dependent.201 The proposal was engendered by a trend
of modernization as well as flexibility of the national industrial
195. Miguel Rodríguez-Piñero, Contrato de trabajo y autonomía del trabajador, in
TRABAJO SUBORDINADO Y TRABAJO AUTÓNOMO EN LA DELIMITACIÓN DE FRONTERAS DE
DERECHO DEL TRABAJO: ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JOSÉ CABRERA BAZÁN 21, 21
(Jesús Cruz Villalón ed., 1999); Martínez Barroso & María de los Reyes, Trabajo
autónomo y trabajo subordinado. Delimitación, análisis y propuestas de reforma, 273
ESTUDIOS FINANCIEROS 71, 122 (2005).
196. See Antonio Corral & Esteban Villarejo, Spain:
Self-Employed Workers,
EURWORK (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwor
k/comparative-information/national-contributions/spain/spain-self-employedworkers.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Carmen Parra, Aznar y los sindicatos sellan el pacto sobre pensiones, EL PAIS (Oct. 10,
1996), http://elpais.com/diario/1996/10/10/economia/844898426_850215.html.
200. See Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 Presidency Conclusion,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2000), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm.
201. Id.
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relations that ended the era of the employee as “protagonist” of the
social and political life of Spain.202
In 2007, after consultations with non-governmental partners, the
Spanish legislature enacted a new law, Estatuto del trabajo autónomo
(“LETA,” or the Statute for Self-Employed Workers).203 LETA regulated
all forms of self-employed or independent contractor-type work and
covered all aspects of self-employment.204 This comprehensive scope is
the most commonly recognized virtue of the Spanish legislative
intervention towards an “experimental direction.”205 Self-employed
workers are defined as individuals “not subject to the authority or
organization of another person.”206 This comprehensive and systematic
intervention was justified in light of the profound changes that the
Spanish labor market was undergoing.207
Workers who are part of this self-employed or independent
contractor category are entitled to benefits in the case of termination
(“prestación por cese de actividad”), maternity and paternity leave,
temporary sickness (“prestación social por incapacidad temporal”), and
beneficial social security programs for special groups (disabled,
artisans or young entrepreneurs, inter alia).208 Moreover, selfemployed workers in dangerous industries can retire early (“jubilación
anticipada”) without forfeiting social security benefits.209 Lastly, selfemployed workers can collectively organize and exercise collective
rights, including the right to strike and to bargain collectively
(“acuerdos de interés profesional”).210
202. Antonio Ojeda Avilés, La “externalización” del derecho del trabajo, 128 REVISTA
INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO 51–72 (2009).
203. Jaime Cabeza Pereiro, The Status of Self-Employed Workers in Spain, 147 INT’L LAB.
REV. 91, 91 (2008) (citing Estatuto del Trabajo autónomo (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain)).
204. Spain was also the first country to systematically regulate self-employed
relationships by drafting a “comprehensive and systematic legal framework covering
all aspects of self-employment.” See Corral & Villarejo, supra note 196. See generally
Pereiro, supra note 203, at 91–94.
205. See Pereiro, supra note 203, at 98.
206. Id. at 93 (referencing the Estatuto del Trabajo autónomo (B.O.E. 2007, 20)
(Spain)).
207. What matters is that the worker does not employ any other workers in
performing the services (Article 11, lett. a). This interpretation seems to be correct
in light of the law’s introduction that, in defining the scope of the economically
dependent worker’s protection, refers to “empresarios sin asalariados” (entrepreneurs
without employees).
208. Constitucion Espanola 27 diciembre 1978 (cited as Art. 16 C.E.).
209. Id. Art. 26(4) C.E.
210. See Pereiro, supra note 203, at 96–97.
Law No. 11/1985 of 2 August 1985, Official Gazette, No. 189, dated 8 August 1985,
pp. 25,119.
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1.

The creation of the TRADE
Most interestingly for our analysis, LETA also crafted a third
category of workers: “Trabajador Autonomo Economicamente Dependiente”
(TRADE or economic dependent self-employed worker).211 Because
Spain has a civil legal system, workers needed to rely on legislation to
claim their rights. The legislature, in creating the TRADE category,
was trying to ensure increased protections for a subset of
independent contractors. However, these workers did not receive the
complete set of protections reserved to employees but “only
protections specifically provided by LETA.” This intermediate
category captures the Italian notion of legal dependency in the quasisubordinate or “lavoratori parasubordinati” category.
TRADE workers enjoy some legal protections, such as minimum
wage, annual leave, entitlements in case of wrongful termination,
leave for family or health reasons, and collective bargaining.212 They
are entitled to an annual vacation, a set number of days off per week,
a limit on working hours, the right to be covered by insurance against
work-related accidents and diseases, and protection for workers
unemployed as a result of business failure.213 As a result, they enjoy a
set of rights “beyond the statement of basic rights and duties of selfemployed workers—vaguely reminiscent of those of employees, albeit
without equivalent guarantees or legal status [of employees].”214 The
distinction between the employee and the TRADE categories lies in
the notion of “alienness,” or ajenidad, described above. While the
employee does not own the means of production and the productive
tools and infrastructure, the TRADE owns his or her tools and is
equipped with all the hallmarks of genuine self-employment.215
Interestingly, the category was not a reaction to disguised
employment relationships but a way to offer a special legal
arrangement for authentic self-employed workers.216 The legislative
intervention represents a wider trend of expanding the class of
individuals protected by labor law. The trend is motivated by the
desire to protect workers in the “grey area,” or at the margin of the
self-employment category. In particular, according to Professor Cruz
211. Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain).
212. Id. arts. 4, 8, 10, 16, 19.
213. Id.; see Pereiro, supra note 203, at 94, 98.
214. Pereiro, supra note 203, at 93.
215. See Perulli, supra note 167, at 12–13 (defining one hallmark of self-employment as
control over materials necessary for activities separate from those of the client).
216. See, e.g., Pereiro, supra note 203, at 93–94 (explaining the intention to
regulate and define parasubordination, or economic dependence).
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Villalón, the focus on managerial power and the degree of
organization was reduced progressively, to such an extent that selfemployment ended up being included within the employee
category—namely, domestic work, teleworking, work in group.217
The introduction of the TRADE classification essentially ended the
traditional “binary divide.”
The crucial component for determining whether a worker is a
TRADE rests on a threshold of economic dependency measured, by
law, at seventy-five percent.218 There are other criteria, framed as
multifactorial tests, that inform the distinction between TRADE and
other categories of workers. Four factors help distinguish TRADE
workers from employees: (1) amount of independent work or
reliance on the principal’s directives; (2) the worker undertakes an
obligation of personal service, without using subcontractors; (3) the
worker bears the entrepreneurial risk; and (4) actual ownership of
the tools and instrumentalities of production.219 To distinguish
TRADE from independent contractors or self-employed workers,
three factors are instructive: (1) a dependence on the principal for
at least seventy-five percent of the worker’s income,220 (2) not hiring
subcontractors, and (3) the performance of an economic or
professional activity directly and predominantly vis-à-vis one single
principal.221 An implicit requirement of the TRADE category
encompasses “continuity in the relationship”; hence, the 2007 LETA
also regulates working hours, holidays, time and place of the duties
rendered.222 In sum, the critical element of the TRADE test is the
217. The “expansive trend” was slowed down first by removing some form of work
from the employee category (in the case of goods transport workers who, in 1994, were
excluded from the scope of labor law). See Jesús Cruz Villalón, Il lavoro autonomo
economicamente dipendente in Spagna, 2 DIRITTI LAVORI MERCATI 287, 291 (2013).
218. Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo art. 11 (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain).
219. Id.
220. See Modernising Labour Law, supra note 166, at 11 n.33 (stating that this
requirement does not imply that “these workers are necessarily in a vulnerable
position”). Controversially, a TRADE could be at the same time an independent
contractor. See Juan Antonio Hernández Nieto, La desnaturalización del trabajador
autónomo: el autónomo dependiente, in ASPECTOS COLECTIVOS DE LAS RELACIONES
LABORALES 177, 184–85 (2010).
221. Modernising Labour Law, supra note 166.
222. See Eduardo Rojo Torrecilla, El trabajador autónomo económicamente dependiente
(TRADE) puede ser (temporalmente) empleador de un solo trabajador por cuenta ajena. Una
nota a la reforma de los artículos 11 y 16 de la Ley 20/2007 de 11 de julio por la Ley 31/2015
ROJO
BLOG
(Sept.
14,
2015),
de
9
de
septiembre,
EDUARDO
http://www.eduardorojotorrecilla.es/2015/09/el-trabajador-autonomoeconomicamente.html.

CHERRYALOISI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/13/2017 6:35 PM

“DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS” IN THE GIG ECONOMY

673

percentage of income gained from work-related, economic, or
professional activities from a single principal.
There are numerous formal and procedural requirements to
become classified as a TRADE worker. In furtherance of contractual
freedom, article 12 of LETA states that workers themselves must
disclose their status as TRADE to the principal at the time of
inception of the contract and “register” the position with the social
administration agency.223 Furthermore, workers must disclose to the
principal and the administrative agency any change in the workers’
situation that affects their status as TRADE (e.g., alteration of the
percentage of the worker’s economic dependence) because the
principal may need to verify information provided by the workers.224
These strict requirements are burdensome and time-consuming for
both workers and businesses.225
A debate developed among scholars and judges about the legal
effect of not following these procedural elements. In 2011, the
Tribunal Supremo resolved the debate by stating that the disclosure of
the worker as TRADE is an “ad solemnitaten” requirement (i.e.,
mandatory),226 while the social security registration has an ad
probationem” effect (i.e., permissive).227 The New Spanish Labour
Procedure Act 36/2011228 affirmed that the TRADE contract must be
formalized in order to be valid.229 Absent a written contract, the
presumption is that a worker is an employee. In 2015, a new reform
granted the TRADE worker a number of additional safeguards, such
as subcontracting for an annual period as a worker in the case of
maternity or paternity leave, among other situations.230 The reform

223. Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo art. 12 (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain).
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Mark Freedland, Application of Labour and Employment Law Beyond the
Contract of Employment, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 3, 11 (2007) (explaining the complicated
dynamics that encourage the greater security of standard employee relations).
226. S.T.S., June 12, 2012 (R.J., No. 8539, p. 26,566–67) (Spain).
227. S.T.S., June 11, 2011 (R.J., No. 6391, p. 17,820–26) (Spain).
228. Reguladora de la jurisdicción social, disposición final segunda (B.O.E. 2011,
36) (Spain).
229. See Tiziano Treu, Le riforme del lavoro: Spagna e Italia, DIRITTO DELLE RELAZIONI
INDUSTRIALI No. 3/XXV (2015), http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/wp-content/uploads
/2015/09/dri_3_2015_treu.pdf (noting the rigid establishment of the new economic
dependent autonomous worker category).
230. Por la que se modifica y actualiza la normativa en materia de autoempleo y se
adoptan medidas de fomento y promoción del trabajo autónomo y de la Economía
Social art. 1.3 (B.O.E. 2015, 31) (Spain); see Torrecilla, supra note 222.
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was intended to reconcile private and professional life by preventing
such situations from causing the termination of the contract.231
2.

The low number of TRADE workers and developments on the EU level
In Spain, few workers have actually become classified as TRADE
due to the burdensome procedural requirements.
In 2014,
232
according to Servicio Público de Empleo de TRADE, the population of
self-employed workers was several million, while the number of
TRADE was less than 16,000.233 This number is inconsistent with
calculations made by Instituto Nacional de Estadística, who counted
258,000 TRADE.234 Still, even if we use the higher number, that
would still only account for “12.5% of the total number of selfemployed workers without employees.”235
Meanwhile, Spanish labor unions complained that the TRADE
category was inappropriately covering what should be traditional
employment relationships.236 Conversely, employers’ associations
were afraid of the opposite risk: that the category would swallow up
authentic self-employed workers, augmenting business costs.237
Unfortunately, the European Commission had predicted an
unsuccessful outcome of the TRADE category in a Green Paper:
“while increasing certainty and transparency and ensuring a
minimum level of protection of the self-employed, such requirements
could, however, have the effect of limiting the scope of these
contractual arrangements.”238 The legislature may need to revisit the
content of this law because it offers protections too close to those of
the typical employee.
In terms of developments around the gig economy in Spain, a
Barcelona judge has referred several questions about the on-demand
economy to the European Court of Justice. The European Court of

231. Torrecilla, supra note 222.
232. Datos estadísticos de empleo: Estadísticas desde mayo 2005, SERVICIO PÚBLICO DE
EMPLEO ESTATAL, http://www.sepe.es/contenidos/que_es_el_sepe/estadisticas/datos
_estadisticos/empleo/datos/estadisticas_nuevas.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
233. Teresa Alvarez Martín-Nieto, Caída de los Autónomos Económicamente
Dependientes, CINCO DIAS (Feb. 10, 2015, 9:11 PM), http://cincodias.com/cincodias/
2015/02/09/autonomos/1423494891_645557.html.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Villalón, supra note 217, at 295.
237. Id.
238. Modernising Labour Law, supra note 166, at 12.
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Justice is expected to decide whether Uber is a taxi service or a digital
service provider.239
D. Summary and Assessment of the Outcomes in Canada, Spain, and Italy
Having examined in detail the ways that the Canadian, Italian, and
Spanish legal systems have established frameworks for dealing with
the third category, we can develop some guidelines from these
experiences. Some of these lessons are directly applicable to the
recent proposals for creating a third category for gig economy
platform workers. We have seen three different histories and three
different outcomes, showing us mistakes as well as successes. Spain
provided an example of a legal system that adopted a third category
only to see it limited to a small percentage of self-employed workers.
The law assumes that TRADE workers are predominantly working for
one business; this assumption could be a problem for platform
workers who are working for multiple platforms. The burdensome
requirements to be met and the use of a strict economic threshold
are the primary reasons that the law has seen only very limited use.
From Italy’s various experiments with the third category, we saw an
indecisive and almost mercurial modification of the third category in
the years since its adoption. Businesses used the Italian third
category as a discounted alternative to what should have been a
standard employment relationship. In fact, companies used the
presence of the third category of parasubordinato to evade regulations
applicable to employees, such as social security contributions. In
essence, the quasi-subordinate category created a loophole that
actually resulted in less protection for workers as an unintended
consequence. Through the years, lawmakers attempted to adjust the
category in order to provide appropriate coverage. Each successive
action by the Italian legislature was an emergency intervention as a
reaction to the misuse of the third category. The end result was
confusion. Since 2015, the third category is extremely limited and
workers are presumed to be employees.
There is a difference in the genesis, the content, and the effects of
the intermediate category between Spain and Italy.240
Italy’s
239. See Murad Ahmed, Judge Refers Spanish Uber Case to European Court of Justice,
FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://on.ft.com/1DqlTdc (explaining that the decision
could lift bans on Uber across Europe).
240. See Giuseppe Santoro Passarelli, El Trabajo Autónomo Económicamente
Dependiente en Italia, 98 DOCUMENTACIÓN LABORAL 2, 10 (2013) (explaining that
Spain’s understanding of economic dependence differed from Italy in that Italy’s
focused on “coordinated and sustained collaborations”).

CHERRYALOISI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

676

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/13/2017 6:35 PM

[Vol. 66:635

framework, enacted by the 1973 Reform, does not provide substantive
protections. Protections reserved to TRADE are much stronger than
the ones reserved to lavoratori parasubordinati. However, there are
similarities in that the intermediate category was misused in both Spain
and Italy. In Italy, the intermediate category was used to disguise bona
fide employment relationships. In Spain, arbitrage of the categories
shifted what should have been TRADE workers into independent
contractor status because of the high level of legal protection and
burdensome procedures associated with the TRADE category.
As for Canada, the passage of legislation in the 1970s technically
created a third category of “dependent contractors” through
amending the definition of “employee” in various statutes. The
practical result of the “dependent contractor” category was to expand
the definition of employee and to bring more workers under the
ambit of labor law protection. As a result, there was increased
coverage and a provision for a safe harbor for workers in need of
protections based on economic dependency. The third category
seems to have worked well in terms of expanding the coverage of the
laws to an increasing number of workers.
IV. ANALYSIS OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE GIG ECONOMY:
SOLUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The implementations of the hybrid category in Canada, Italy, and
Spain long predated the development of platform crowdwork. Even
before platforms and mobile apps, the binary test between employee
classification and independent contractor left many workers in a no
man’s land. Those workers included delivery drivers, errand runners,
odd job workers, and couriers, with several providing services that, in
many respects, resemble the services provided by modern-day gig
economy companies, such as TaskRabbit, Postmates, Grubhub, and
Uber. As such, these countries’ experiences with adopting the third
category are useful in terms of evaluating what types of policies are
successful and which have been problematic.
At the outset, we should note that the debate over misclassification
can be interpreted two different ways. One way to view the issue is to
acknowledge that there has been legitimate confusion about forms of
gig work that do not fit easily into the binary distinctions currently
recognized under U.S. law. After all, gig-workers have some
characteristics that are common to independent contractors and yet
others that are reminiscent of employees. In fact, the question of
proper classification may be confusing even without the addition of
technology; work can be structured in varying ways. The problem,
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under this view, lies with a legal test that is malleable, fact-intensive,
and difficult to apply. The other way to consider the misclassification
issue is to acknowledge that there has long been arbitrage of the law,
meaning illegitimate practices that lead to misclassification of what
truly are employment relationships.
These practices hide
employment relationships under the guise of false or bogus
contractor situations.
Note that these two views of the
misclassification problem are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to
have a poorly constructed multi-factorial test and, at the same time, to
have businesses arbitraging the test to take advantage of the savings
from classifying a worker as an independent contractor.
Any legislative or judicial intervention on this issue must take
account of both views. One potential solution to the first problem
might be establishing a third category to alleviate confusion over how
to apply the test to gig workers. However, if the consequences of
establishing such a third category would be arbitrage and result in
downgrading employees to intermediate status, that would do
nothing to eliminate the problem of bogus contractor status. In fact,
adding a third category would only increase the amount of arbitrage.
Three categories create more room for mischief than two, and we can
see from the Italian case that such arbitrage became widespread in
response to the adoption of the quasi-subordinate workers.
A. Working Backwards to Determine Rights for the Third Category
Another way to look at this problem is to work backwards and ask:
Which of the rights and responsibilities that employees enjoy would
not be appropriate for workers in the intermediate category? As we
saw from the Italian and Spanish cases, the kinds of rights and
responsibilities that go along with the third category are just as
important, if not more so, than the creation of the category itself.
The rights available could be very few, mirroring independent
contractor status, or, as in Spain, the rights could closely resemble
those of employees. Either way, there are serious risks to face.
Construct the third category with too few rights, as in the Italian case,
and it will run the risk of arbitrage, with businesses forcing genuine
employees into the third category to try to lower costs. But make the
third category either too generous or too burdensome to opt into, as
has been the case with the TRADE in Spain, and very few will bother
using the category. Continuing with this line of inquiry, the process
of trying to work backwards to determine which rights these gig
workers would have available and which they would not be entitled to
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is far more complicated than it appears. What rights and obligations
would be left out of the hybrid category?
As an example of engaging with this line of analysis, consider the
Harris and Krueger proposal in which those workers falling into the
independent worker category would not be guaranteed minimum
wage.241 The reasoning behind the proposed exclusion, Harris and
Krueger argue, is that in the gig economy, it is difficult to determine an
hourly wage, and the hours may be impossible to trace across
platforms.242 However, that argument shows a lack of understanding
about the technology that is used for crowdwork. Contrary to Harris
and Krueger’s assertion, there is no lack of data or any difficulty tracing
hours. In fact, the platforms that enable matching workers with
consumers who need their services also allow for the gathering of data
about the work and the workers on a completely unprecedented scale.
Indeed, most ridesharing apps feature real-time GPS tracking and
updated ratings from customers, but those are just the features that
are visible to users. Both workers and customers generate additional
data that platform companies collect and analyze, much of which is
used to improve future performance. Indeed, many platforms can
measure precisely how much time and effort a worker spends on a
task, down to the minutes spent waiting in traffic (in the case of a
ridesharing app) or the number of keystrokes (in the case of
crowdwork). In fact, one of the major concerns with platform work is
not difficulty tracing time, work, and hours, as Harris and Krueger
posit, but rather the constant and pervasive surveillance through
GPS, phone, and app data.243
The idea of exempting gig workers from minimum wage
requirements seems poorly thought-out.244 To date, many of the gigworker cases that have alleged worker misclassification have been FLSA
claims.245 One of the most salient complaints that gig workers have
brought forward is the lack of a living wage or decent pay. As
documented in one of the author’s previous articles, many crowdwork

241. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 13.
242. Id. at 20.
243. See Bodie et al., supra note 71, at 1–3 (describing the rise of people analytics and
the use of big data at work, and expressing concerns for both user and worker privacy).
244. Miriam A. Cherry, Mindestlohn für Crowdarbeit? [A Minimum Wage for
Crowdwork?], in CROWDWORK—ZURÜCK IN DIE ZUKUNFT?: PERSPEKTIVEN DIGITALER
ARBEIT [CROWDWORK—BACK TO THE FUTURE?: PERSPECTIVES ON DIGITAL LABOR] 231–
40 (Christiane Benner ed., 2014).
245. Cherry, supra note 1, at 584–85 (cataloging the currently pending gig
economy company cases).
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platforms pay less than minimum wage, with some paying amounts that
are on average less than half that of the federal minimum wage.246
Meanwhile, there has been a widespread move by the “Fight for
Fifteen” campaign to raise the minimum wage in the United States to
fifteen dollars per hour.247 Statistics show that the current federally
mandated minimum wage is low enough that a full-time minimum
wage salary will not cover food and rent for a working family.248 If
there is generally a movement to raise the federal minimum wage,
why have a proposal concurrently to eliminate minimum wage
completely for gig workers? This is a rhetorical question, of course;
but, as one of the authors has previously written, exempting certain
work from minimum wage would only exacerbate the problem of
exploitation of workers in the gig economy.249
If retracting the minimum wage for the gig economy seems
problematic, what about excluding other rights from the gig worker
hybrid category? Would we choose to exempt platforms from
generally applicable laws that prohibit employers from making
employment decisions based on prohibited factors such as race, sex,
age, and disability?250 On platforms, especially those involving purely
digital labor, individual workers are often faceless and nameless. But
that too may be a flawed assumption as even a screen name or a
picture of dark skin—or even an avatar with darker skin—might
result in employment discrimination. In reality, provision of services
through platforms has the potential to be biased based on customer
prejudice.
Researchers have begun to document the biases
embedded in the review and rating systems that many platforms
246. Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077,
1078, 1093–94 (2009).
247. See Katrina vanden Heuvel, How a $15 Minimum Wage Went from “Extreme” to
Enacted, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how
-a-15-minimum-wage-went-from-extreme-to-enacted/2016/04/05/6cf53d20-fa9f-11e5
-80e4-c381214de1a3_story.html?utm_term=.839aa4cdf6e9 (estimating that eighteen
percent of the workforce will be on their way to $15 an hour after New York and
California pass their minimum wage laws).
248. See HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., HARDSHIPS IN AMERICA: THE
REAL STORY OF WORKING FAMILIES 3–4, 44, 48 (2001) (finding that working full-time
does not isolate families from hardship); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED:
ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA 61 (2001) (describing the author’s experiment with
minimum wage jobs).
249. See Cherry, supra note 1, at 586–87 (arguing against an exemption for
minimum wage); see also Cherry, supra note 244.
250. For a general overview of the scope of anti-discrimination laws, see Marcia L.
McCormick, The Truth Is out There: Revamping Federal Anti-Discrimination Enforcement
for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP’T & LAB. L. 193, 193–231 (2009).
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use.251 There is a great deal of jurisprudence under Title VII holding
that so-called “customer preference” for workers of a certain race or
gender is not an excuse for employment discrimination.252 The fact
that customer ratings are now embedded in online platforms, and in
fact may sometimes be the only factor used to terminate a worker’s
access to the app, is troubling.253
What about excluding other protections from the category?
Should gig workers have the ability to report crimes that they notice
on the job to law enforcement without retaliation? If a gig worker is
injured while carrying out an assignment obtained from a platform,
should the worker have the right to collect worker’s compensation, or
is redress for the tort system? Ultimately, the “working backwards”
plan to determine which of the rights allocated by labor and
employment law are expendable for gig workers is a losing
proposition. Determining which rights to eliminate is an impossible
dilemma, especially when those granted to employees in the United
States are meager compared to those guaranteed to workers in many
industrialized nations.254 Each of these laws or sets of laws was passed
in order to give workers basic protections that they could not achieve
on their own due to the imbalance of power between workers and
employers. Cutting protections only for the sake of creating a
discounted category seems not only artificial, but bears no rational
relationship to the realities of gig work or the technology that is
being used on platforms themselves.
B. Practical Difficulties with Implementation of a Third Category
Apart from difficulties in defining the third category and the
protections or exclusions it would contain, we also feel that it is
important to note that, solely on a practical level, it might be difficult
to create a third category exclusively for gig workers in the United
251. See Aaron Belzer & Nancy Leong, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 30–32), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=2687486 (predicting that platform users of minority races will receive
worse service until they are eventually denied altogether); Rosenblat & Stark, supra
note 37, at 14 (suggesting a new study on bias in ratings analyzing heterosexual white
men compared to minority populations).
252. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 297, 299, 302, 304 (N.D.
Tex. 1981).
253. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 37, at 12 (stating that drivers need to
maintain, on average, a 4.6/5 stars or above to remain active on Uber, and they
cannot remove a rating even if it is given to them unfairly).
254. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MIRIAM CHERRY, GLOBAL ISSUES IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
170–86 (Samuel Estreicher & Miriam Cherry eds., 2008).
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States. Proponents have made it seem like creating the third category
will be natural or easy.255 But it would actually be a complex
legislative intervention, largely in part because there would have to be
hard decisions, as mentioned above, about which rights and
responsibilities to include and exclude from the categories.
Additionally, determining where a worker would fit within the three
categories would have its own doctrinal elements and the potential
for misclassification, arbitrage, and confusion.
It is possible that judges and administrative bodies could, on their
own authority, shift their interpretation of the statutes so as to carve
out or constitute an intermediate category. But this is unlikely, given
the way that the statutes are written. Adding a third classification
when the statutes only call for two categories would constitute a vast
feat of judicial activism. It would also be seen as the kind of process
that would likely require political debate and discussion associated
more with legislation than with judicial decision making. In light of
the political decisions and consequences that surround the issue of
the third category, judges would likely demur from creating a new
category without guidance from the legislature.
The ridesharing cases provide an illustrative example. In Cotter v. Lyft,
Judge Vince Chhabria famously stated that the case was like being
“handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes.”256
Yet, even acknowledging that the gig workers were not a particularly
good fit for either employee or independent contractor status, Judge
Chhabria turned the case over to the jury and is now presiding over the
settlement agreement. Therefore, even though some judges recognize
that the on/off switch between independent contractor and employee is
an imperfect fit for the realities of work today, they have not dared to
create another category on their own initiative.
Creating a third category in the United States for gig workers
would most likely require legislative action. It is true that legislation
has lagged woefully behind technological developments.257 However,
there has recently been some legislation that directly responded to
255. Seth Harris was quoted as stating that “[a]fter we produced the paper, we
joked that we succeeded in making everybody mad by coming up with the right
answer.” Guerrieri, supra note 3.
256. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
257. David Mercer, Technology and the Law: Dealing with the “Law Lag,” AUSTRALIAN
(July 4, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/business/techn
ology-and-the-law-dealing-with-the-law-lag/story-fn8ex0p1-1226086951328
(explaining how new advances in science and technology demand the knowledge
necessary to properly apply appropriate legal principles and consideration of the
contexts in which they arise).
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recent technological developments, such as the JOBS Act258 for
online crowdfunding.259 There has also been legislation that ended
or otherwise cracked down on the use of technology; for instance,
online prediction markets that allowed participants to engage in
forecasting about future political, economic, or social events were
unwittingly outlawed by the Unlawful Internet Gambling Act of
2006.260 Legislative change can be slow, unwieldy, and difficult to
predict. There are also changes that would need to happen in state
legislatures, as many states have statutes that similarly only apply to
employees. Ultimately, the possibility of political change is uncertain,
and the intervention is far from a panacea.
C. Shifting Towards a Default Presumption of Employee Status
One way to govern the difficult classification issues that have arisen
is to make changes regarding the default presumptions around
employee and independent contractor status. Because it will be
difficult to implement a third category and there is, as of yet, little or
no consensus on how to constitute the category or how it might meet
the needs of platforms and gig workers, a third category may not be
feasible. To address current misclassification issues, one solution
might be to change the default presumptions regarding the two
categories that already exist. Currently, many platform companies
operate in an environment where the triangular relationship between
the platform, customer, and worker obscures the role of the platform
as employer.261 If a company deems workers to be independent
contractors, it is left up to the workers, or perhaps to government
agencies (like the Social Security Administration or the Internal
Revenue Service), to contest that status as misclassification. Such a
default actually encourages misclassification as there is the potential
that no one will want to invest the time, patience, and effort in
starting an administrative action or lawsuit to challenge the firm’s
258. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
259. See Joan MacLeod Hemmingway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335, 336, 340–41, 357 (2012) (focusing on
Congress’s move for capital formation for small businesses).
260. See Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, First Amendment and Prediction
Markets, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 833–37 (2008) (explaining how legislation can
damage predictive speech).
261. See Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, TaskRabbit, and Co.: Platforms as
Employers? Rethinking the Legal Anaysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619,
634 (2016) (stating that crowdwork “challenges the very existence of a contract of
employment, leaving individual workers without recourse to the majority of domestic
employment protective legislation”).
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initial misclassification. It is true that misclassification can result in
costly legal challenges and in some instances lead to penalties, but
many companies are willing to take that risk. In other words,
companies feel it is better to risk asking for forgiveness rather than
first getting permission.262 Meanwhile, workers face high transaction
costs in trying to get the work re-classified: the time and expense of
becoming involved in a lawsuit. As the jobs involved often encompass
low-paid casual work, the effort may not be worthwhile.
Instead of the current system in which the firm chooses how to
classify workers and then later justifies its position in litigation, we
should consider working with a different presumption. Assume that
above a minimum threshold of hours worked, the default
classification would be an employment relationship. That would be
the case even if the work was on a platform or completely took place
in cyberspace. It would be an employment relationship even if the
arrangement were flexible, even if the worker provided his or her
own tools of the trade, and even if it were considered part-time
employment. There would then be opt-outs for those who are truly
independent businesses and genuinely self-employed. However, such
an opt-out could not be a condition of work on a platform.
Currently, such coerced choice is stuck into online EULAs, which are
little more than adhesion contracts. In these EULAs, workers have
no other choice but a “take it or leave it” bargain with an online form
that many users have not even read.
There are some on-demand economy companies that have already,
on their own initiative, engaged in shifting their workers to be
employee status. HomeHero is a mobile platform that provides
home health care and elder care. It recently shifted from an
independent contractor to an employee based model.
The
company’s CEO claimed that it did so “[i]n order to ensure a
consistent experience as we scale nationwide.”263 In the words of the
CEO of Shyp, a package delivery service that also moved from
independent contractors to an employee model, the company’s
262. Indeed, this seems to be a key lynchpin of Uber’s regulatory and compliance
strategy: do business first, and ask questions later. See, e.g., Becki Smith, Uber’s Labor
Relations Is Driving It into a Ditch, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 2, 2016, 2:57 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/ubers-labor-relations-driving-it-ditch-422285
(highlighting the ways in which Uber ignores regulations and fights against worker
accountability so they can “litigate, litigate, litigate” later).
263. Annlee Ellingson, Why HomeHero Is Converting All of Its Independent Contractors
to W-2 Employees, L.A. BIZ (Mar. 1, 2016, 12:07 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/losa
ngeles/news/2016/03/01/why-homehero-is-converting-all-of-its-independent.html
(quoting Kyle Hill, CEO of HomeHero).
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“investment in a longer-term relationship with our couriers” would
“ultimately create the best experience for our customers.”264
Other platform companies have classified their workers as
employees from their inception. Examples of these companies
include Hello Alfred; Managed by Q; Munchery; the transit service,
Bridj; and the temporary agency, BlueCrew.265 The CEO of Hello
Alfred noted a commitment between the company and the workers
who want more than a gig; these workers want a career path.266
Because many of the platform businesses are based on people serving
other people who are often repeat customers rather than one-off
transactions, providing appropriate training and career advancement
to workers makes business sense. Some platform companies have
provided benefits, including health insurance.267 Their hope is to
stand out from other platforms and attract the most talented workers.
These experiences demonstrate that the platform economy can still
exist when workers are provided with the rights afforded to
employees. The concerns that burdensome regulations will drive
platforms out of business seem to be overblown, much like earlier
arguments that regulation—of minimum wage, maximum hours,
child labor, and safety—would end various phases or components of
the industrial revolution. To address current misclassification issues,
we come back to the thought that perhaps the best answer is not to
create a third category with an as yet to be determined set of rights
but instead to change the default presumptions vis-a-vis the two preexisting categories. But businesses need certainty, and the safe
harbor that we discuss below would surely be helpful when navigating
the uncertain question of classification.
264. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, EMPLOYERS IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY: WHY
TREATING WORKERS AS EMPLOYEES IS GOOD FOR BUSINESS 2 (2016),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fact-Sheet-Employers-in-the-On-DemandEconomy.pdf (quoting Kevin Gibbon, CEO of Shyp).
265. Smith, supra note 262.
266. See Oscar Perry Abello, This “Gig Economy” Firm Prefers to Have Employees, Not
Contractors, NEXT CITY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/sharingeconomy-jobs-employees-not-contractors (“We believe treating our employees as our
primary customer is how we can best satisfy our end users. It can become difficult to
achieve this with the 1099 classification, because it inherently distances the worker
from the company. There is no onus to provide meaningful work, training, or career
advancement.” (quoting Marcela Sapone, CEO of Hello Alfred)).
267. Cole Stangler, Meet the Gig Economy Companies that See Investing in Workers as a
Smart
Business
Strategy,
IB TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2016,
11:24
AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/meet-gig-economy-companies-see-investing-workers-smartbusiness-strategy-2336721 (using Managed by Q as an example of a company offering
health insurance to gig workers).
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D. Safe Harbor for Volunteerism and Alternative Business Models
Many supporters and lobbyists for Uber or other platform-based
companies have suggested that these businesses deserve room to
maneuver with special rules that amount to a moratorium on existing
labor regulations because they are new, interesting, and will create
more jobs in the future. What would be the justification for granting
platform economy companies such an exemption? A new business
should not be exempted from labor and employment law simply
because it has “cool” technology. Is there a reason that gig businesses
deserve special treatment even better than that of non-profits, which
have to pay minimum wage and follow the other aspects of the labor
and employment laws? The premise of the argument is difficult to
accept as the platform economy is largely for-profit and comprised of
workers who are plying a trade that more or less mimics other work
done as a full-time profession for remuneration.
Some of this confusion and the calls for exemptions certainly come
from the obfuscated language that platform companies use and the
rhetoric around their origins. The “sharing economy” began as a way
for neighbors to assist each other and to engage in more sustainable
modes of production. Rather than ownership, participants in the
sharing economy were interested in gaining access to resources that
would be held in common as shared resources.268 Based on models of
community volunteerism and pooled assets, such as lending libraries
and tool collections, the sharing economy sought to reduce
consumption and increase access to resources. For example, early
commercials for Lyft in the Bay Area showed neighbors assisting their
friends and neighbors without cars, making it more feasible to exist
without a car in an area that was already jammed with traffic.269 The
sharing economy was seen as a “green,” more sustainable choice that
avoided excess consumption.270 The idea of giving others a ride
268. Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative
Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2047, 2048 (2015) (describing the
individual economic benefits as well as the collective interest in the environment of
“sharing, helping others, and engaging in sustainable behavior”).
269. See Maureen Morrison, Lyft’s First Big Ad Campaign: We’re Not Just a
Transportation Service, We Create Community, ADVERT. AGE (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://adage.com/article/digital/lyft-launches-national-campaign/296819
(emphasizing Lyft’s campaign in San Francisco, where it was founded, focusing on
humanity, technology, and community); What Is Lyft?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2bQdf408T8.
270. See Miriam A. Cherry & Winifred R. Poster, Crowdwork, Corporate Social
Responsibility, and Fair Labor Practices, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATIONS 291, 293 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016)
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within the community and helping out one’s neighbors was akin to
volunteerism; payments were to help out with the cost of owning and
garaging a car in the Bay Area, not to constitute a substitute for fulltime employment.
Other crowdwork platforms with innovative business models
developed based on a “prosumer” idea in which those who do work
for the platform (producers) also comprise the audience for the work
(the consumers).
For example, on the Threadless platform,
designers can work on creating new styles for T-shirts.271 The
community votes on the designs to be produced and has first access
to purchase the T-shirts. The designer then profits by receiving a
portion of the shirt sales as compensation for their work.272 This type
of work defies many of the traditional characteristics of either
employees or independent contractors.
The problem, as we noted before, is distinguishing between
authentic innovators, who could compete on a level playing field or
who have a distinct and interesting new business model, and those
platforms that are profiteers who exist “only because [of] the current
haze of legal and regulatory uncertainty.”273 Arbitrageurs who are
merely looking for legal loopholes to undercut traditional service
providers through cheap labor are not creating a “special” or
“different” form of business that would deserve an exemption from
labor and employment law. But business models that either are truly
“sharing,” some mix of profit and non-profit (for example, “B”
corporations),274 or those that engage in prosumer transactions,
genuinely might deserve a break from labor regulations. To the
extent that the sharing economy is about green choices and involves
shared ownership and resources, there should be a safe harbor
created if the work looks more like volunteerism undertaken for
altruistic reasons or community-minded motivations.

(“Crowdwork already presents a myriad of environmental benefits, as the use of
technology and remote work has the potential to reduce fuel from daily
commuting.”); see also Morrison, supra note 269 (describing Lyft’s intention to
combine “humanity and technology”).
271. THREADLESS, https://www.threadless.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
272. For more on Threadless, see JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF
THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 1–3, 6, 8, 228–29, 281, 285 (2008).
273. Jeff Bercovici, Why the Next Uber Wannabe Is Already Dead, INC.COM (Nov. 2015),
http://www.inc.com/magazine/201511/jeff-bercovici/the-1099-bind.html.
274. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility
and Greenwashing¸ 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 294 (2014) (describing “B”
corporations that benefit the environment and communities).
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There are also some instances where the provision of a service is de
minimis and thus does not merit employee status. For example, if a
businessperson used a ridesharing service once a week to pick up her
neighbor on her way into work, that businessperson should not
considered be an employee of Lyft. Neither are those who use Uber
pool or a similar mobile app service to set up and participate in a
carpool to save fuel, parking, and expenses. Nor are we suggesting
that a person who signs up to do a fifteen-minute task on TaskRabbit
once a month is an employee of the platform. These activities seem
to be de minimis or one-off, casual transactions that should not
amount to an employment relationship. Trying to sweep those
extremely casual forms of work into burdensome legalities would
serve no one. Rather, we are more concerned with platforms that
seem to be competing with, or in some instances replacing, full-time
paid employment with on-demand work.275
The concept of a threshold percentage of income or time to
determine the safe harbor seems a sensible one. At this point we are in
no place to determine exactly where to set such a threshold, but it
would serve to separate out an occasional temp or the carpooling Uber
driver from those who are working a solid number of hours on the
platform. Could this look like eight hours per week, roughly only one
working day? Likewise, we do not want to discourage neighbors or
volunteers from providing their services to others in their community
when those efforts are truly voluntary or used only to defray legitimate
expenses. The safe harbor could be constituted in such a way that it
would sweep in these forms of volunteerism or altruistic work.
E. Broader Implications
The gig economy has brought several economic and labor tensions
to the forefront: the need for managerial power and stability versus
the need for flexibility; traditional organizational dependency versus
working for multiple platforms; the choice to label as a self-employed
worker versus such “coerced” labeling in a EULA; geographic diffusion
versus efforts toward a collective voice for crowdworkers. As we wrote
in the previous section, these features define the gig-economy as a
subset of a much broader trend: the contingent, precarious, and
increasingly fissured workplace. The new standard is the so-called nonstandard work. As a consequence, we resist the notion that all will be
well when we have created a separate contractual category for gig
275. See, e.g., Janine Berg, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 543, 570–71 (2016).
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workers. Rather, we aim to look for solutions that will ameliorate
conditions for other forms of precarious work in the workplace.
If we are looking for reforms that would genuinely advance the
welfare of gig workers, we could look to some suggested reforms for
crowdwork. One of the authors describes standards for decent
crowdwork in a recent paper, focusing on fair wages, transparency, and
due process.276 Fair wages may be self-explanatory, but the other two
categories may be less obvious. Suffice it to say that transparency
involves clear listing of payment for work completed as well as accurate
time estimates for how long it takes to complete the work. It also
would include some disclosure of information so that crowdworkers
especially would be able to understand what goals or projects their
small tasks were advancing.277 Additionally, it would include sharing
information about the companies that use the platform, including
information like whether they pay promptly and treat crowdworkers
fairly. Finally, due process would prevent wage theft and allow workers
to contest or question a poor rating before it would be used against
them.278 Workers need security, and a solution could be “to expand
the scope of labour protection beyond employment.”279
CONCLUSION
Calls for a new “dependent contractor” hybrid category in the
United States reflexively appear as an attractive and easy solution,
especially as they are touted as being tailor-made for the gig economy.
That initial reaction, however, is tempered upon further study of the
content and history of the implementation of the third category in
other nations. In this paper we have examined the hybrid worker
categories in Canada, Italy, and Spain to learn from their experiences.
In Italy, the adoption of the third category led to widespread
arbitrage of the categories with businesses moving employees into a
“bogus” discounted status in the quasi-subordinate category. In
Spain, the requirements for attaining the third category were
burdensome enough that the third category only is applicable to a
small number of workers. Viewed in this light, experimenting with a
third category might be seen as more risky than just the easy or
obvious solution as it first appears.

276. See Cherry & Poster, supra note 270.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Fudge, supra note 9, at 633–34 (arguing against seeing employment “as a
personal bilateral contract characterized by subordination”).
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Rather than risking arbitrage between the categories, and the
possibility that some workers will actually end up losing rights, it
makes sense to think about employment status as the default rule for
most gig workers, except those that may fit into a safe harbor because
they are either not working very much (true “amateurs”) or are
engaged in volunteerism for altruistic reasons (truly “sharing”). If
there is to be a third category, one like Canada’s “dependent
contractor,” which expands the scope of the employment
relationship, would best meet the needs of gig workers. Such a
default rule or expanded definition makes sense whether we are
thinking about gig workers, those in fissured workplaces, franchises,
or other non-standard or contingent work arrangements. The gig
economy is only the most visible or extreme example of workplace
fissuring, but they are all part of the same larger trend.

